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Book._ 1 /l & 













/ 


A 


COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC: 





BY THE REV. JOHN WESLEY, M.A., 


LATE FELLOW OF LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD. 

THE WHOLE ILLUSTRATED WITH 
COPIOUS NOTES, EXAMPLES, AND EXPLANATIONS, 
A SERIES OF QUESTIONS FOR SELF-EXAMINATION, 

A DICTIONARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS, 

AND NUMEROUS EXERCISES. 


BY THOMAS JACKSON, B.A., 

* - ' 


9 


OF ST. MARY HALL, OXFORD. 


f> 

o ) 


LONDON: 

PRINTED FOR THOMAS TEGG & SON, 73 , 
CHEAPSIDE 5 R. GRIFFIN, & Co., GLASGOW ; 
AND TEGG, WISE, &Co., DUBLIN. 


MPCCCXXXVI. 





<' I have since found abundant reason to praise God for giving me 
this honest art. By this, when men have hedged me m by 
what they call demonstrations, I have been many times able 
to dash them to pieces; in spite of all its covers, to touch the 
very point where the fallacy lay; and it flew open in a mo¬ 
ment.”—J ohn Wesley. 



ENTERED AT STATIONERS’-HALL. 


London:— Printed by James Nichols, 46, Hoxton-Square. 







PREFACE. 


Notwithstanding the odium which lias 
been cast upon that system of Logic which 
Aristotle first arranged, by men no less dis¬ 
tinguished for their brilliant attainments 
than their natural genius, its use and im¬ 
portance are generally acknowledged. In 
fact, its most powerful and uncompromising 
opponents reason, however unwillingly, upon 
the principles which it inculcates. The ob¬ 
jections urged against the syllogism, so much 
and so unjustly censured, are, as Archbishop 
Whately has acutely observed, equally appli¬ 
cable to all kinds of reasoning whatever ; 
and there is more assumption necessary in 
induction, considered as a method of argu¬ 
ment, than in the syllogism itself. 

a 2 



ly 


PREFACE. 


To attempt an elaborate and philosophical 
defence of the scholastic Logic, within the 
brief limits of a preface, and that of an 
unassuming, elementary treatise, would be 
absurd. And, perhaps, those for whose use 
and improvement especially it has been com¬ 
piled, will be content with the recorded 
judgment of a man, to whose opinions they 
are accustomed to pay more than ordinary 
deference. Mr. Wesley, in his admirable 
Address to the Clergy, observes, with regard 
to the study of Logic, “ May we not say, 
that the knowledge of one, (whether art or 
science,) although now quite unfashionable, 
is even necessary next, and in order, to the 
knowledge of Scripture itself ? I mean logic. 
For what is this, if rightly understood, but 
the art of good sense ? of apprehending 
things clearly, judging truly, and reasoning 
conclusively ? What is it, viewed in another 
light, but the art of learning and teaching ? 
whether by convincing or persuading. What 
is there, then, in the whole compass of 


PREFACE. 


V 


science, to be desired in comparison of it?” 
To say that the venerable Founder of Me¬ 
thodism here alludes to the Aristotelian 
system, is almost superfluous; as the brief 
“ Compendium ” which forms the basis of 
the present work, was translated by him, 
into his own sterling English, from the 
cramp and inelegant Latin of Dean Aldrich, 
who was a zealous Aristotelian. In another 
place, Mr. Wesley remarks, that he instructed 
some of his Preachers in “ Pearson on the 
Creed,” and Aldrich’s “ Logic.” 

It is, indeed, no wonder, that Mr. Wes¬ 
ley felt the necessity of an acquaintance with 
the principles and rules of logic. In pro¬ 
portion as a subject is solemn and important, 
so is it incumbent upon those who teach it, 
to reason with force and correctness. They 
must not content themselves with arriving at 
true conclusions and assertions from mere 
accident, but from certain and scientific 
knowledge; they ought to understand the 

grammar of truth. Hence, the Christian 

a 3 


VI 


PREFACE. 


Minister, above all others, should be a sound 
logician, because to him are entrusted the 
most sacred of all verities. 

Yet how few Ministers, comparatively, 
are accurate logicians ! Many carelessly 
leave the important subjects committed to 
their charge, to the chance of being believed 
or rejected by the sceptical heart, unsup¬ 
ported by a single argument, unenforced by 
the shadow of a proof. Others conceal the 
meagre and pitiful proportions of their 
information under a pompous garb of decla¬ 
mation, which can only excite the smile of" 
the wise, the tear of the good, the sarcastic 
grin of the unbeliever. Very different, 
however, is the character of many modern 
sceptics ; not a few of whom are distinguish¬ 
ed by their acquaintance with every kind of 
argument. They are adepts in enveloping 
fallacy in the most seductive dress of reason, 
skilled 

“To make the worse appear the better reason, 

To perplex and dash maturest counsels.” 


PREFACE. 


vii 

Such, probably, were some of the views 
of Mr. Wesley, in translating and abridging 
the excellent manual of Dean Aldrich, which 
is still used as the text-book upon Logic at 
the University of Oxford. It is to be 
regretted, that, instead of abridging that 
work, he did not amplify and illustrate it, 
from his vast stores of knowledge and 
experience in controversy. The genius of 
his active mind, however, was not adapted to 
amplification. The numberless enterprises 
for the good of mankind in which he was en¬ 
gaged, left him no time to sit and pon¬ 
der in studious leisure; and they impart¬ 
ed a habit of succinctness to his mind. In 

9 

none of his works does he ever indulge in 
redundant explanation. In some, he is even 
too concise ; and with the natural feeling of 
a great intellect, he presumes too much upon 
the capacities of his readers. His “ Com¬ 
pendium of Logic 11 is not without the fault 
in question ; presenting rather a brief out¬ 
line of information, to assist the memory 


Till 


PREFACE. 


of one who has considerably advanced in 
the art, than the characteristics of an ele¬ 
mentary treatise. 

It has therefore been thought that the 
re-publication of this tract, with copious 
notes, exercises for practice, and a series of 
questions for self-examination, would be 
neither useless nor unacceptable to those 
for whom the original treatise w r as designed. 
The writer has endeavoured to render his 
illustrations as theological as possible, ac¬ 
cording to the views of the eminent man 
by whom the work was first published 
for popular use. He has freely con¬ 
sulted the most approved works upon the 
subject, published since Mr. Wesley’s death, 
particularly those of Hill, Huyshe, and the 
incomparable volume of Dr. Whately, the 
present Archbishop of Dublin. As he docs 
not claim any originality in his compilation, 
he trusts that he will not be accused of 
immodesty and ambitious pretension. 

Should the reader be disappointed at not 


PREFACE. 


IX 


finding any of the graces of language in the 
following pages, nor any of those splendid 
eccentricities of style at present so much 
admired, lie is requested to remember, that 
the object of the writer is simplicity, in 
order that he may render his subject as easy 
and intelligible as possible. 

London , 

December , 1835. 


CONTENTS. 


BOOK I. 

CHAPTER I. 

Page. 

Of Simple Terms. 1 

II. 

Of Propositions . 2Q 

III. 

Of Syllogism . 42 

IV. 

Of Hypothetical Syllogisms . 72 


BOOK II. 

CHAPTER I. 

Of Syllogism, as to its Matter . 79 

II 

Of Fallacies. S8 










CONTENTS. Xi 

CHAPTER ill. 

Page. 

Of Method... 91 


APPENDIX. 

ON THE MANNER OF USING LOGIC. 
SECTION I. 

Of treating on a simple Theme .. 94 

II. 

Of treating on a Problem. .. 101 


QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS FOR 
EXAMINATION. 

PART I. 

Logical Questions for self-examination 106 

PART II. 

Examples of true and false Syllogisms 

IN ALL THE FlGURES . 134 

PART III. 

Arguments for examination, including 

the Fallacies . 148 


Explanation of technical Terms, 


157 















» 























. 

9 






A 


COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 


BOOK I. 


CHAPTER I. 

OF SIMPLE TERMS. 


SECTION I. 

The operations of the mind are three, 1. 
Simple apprehension; 2. Judgment; 3. Dis¬ 
course or reasoning.* 

It would be better to say, that the operations 
of the mind concerned in argument are three; for 
that there are in all only three, is an assertion by 
no means incontrovertible. 

* Logic, which by synecdoche (or the figure which takes 
a part for a whole) is denominated Dialectics, has been 
called the art of reasoning; or, an instrumental art , direct¬ 
ing the mind into the knowledge of all intellectual things. 
For this reason it ought to be the first of all disciplines, as 
being necessary to the acquirement of the rest ; hence it is 
called by Aristotle the opyavou or instrument of philosophy, 
and of the other sciences. 

B 





2 


COMPENDIUM 


1. Simple apprehension is, the bare con¬ 
ceiving a tiling in the mind. 

O O 

This is, in a certain degree, analogous to the 
perception of the senses. It is either incomplex, 
or complex. Incomplex apprehension is of one 
object, or of several, without any order or refer¬ 
ence; as, “ a king,” “a throne.” Complex appre¬ 
hension is of several objects with such order 
or reference ; as, “ a king upon a throne.” 

2. Judgment is the mind’s determining 
in itself, that the things it conceives agree or 
disagree. 

Or, that one thing belongs or does not belong to 
the other. Judgment is either affirmative, or ne¬ 
gative. Affirmative judgment, also called Com¬ 
position, is that which expresses the agreement 
of the two objects compared. Negative judg¬ 
ment, or division, expresses their mutual disagree¬ 
ment. 

3. Discourse is the progress of the mind 
from one judgment to another. 

The word “ discourse,” as signifying reason¬ 
ing, is obsolete; though the expression, “discur¬ 
sive faculty,” is retained by some writers. 

But our apprehension is apt to be indis¬ 
tinct, our judgment false, our discourse in¬ 
conclusive. To prevent this, wise men pre¬ 
scribed several rules, which were at length 
collected into one body, and termed Logic , 
or the art of reasoning. 


OF LOGIC. 


3 


Of some objects of apprehension our notions are 
unavoidably indistinct, as of the Supreme Being 
and his attributes ; of other objects, only acci¬ 
dentally, as a Ceylonese man’s notion of ice. 

Judgment is misled by sense (as when a man 
conceives that the sun rises out of the sea);—by 
authority and example ; and by the passions. 

N. B. It has often been doubted whether 
Logic is an art or a science : It is both ; a science, 
when considered merely as a theory to be known ; 
an art, when viewed as relating to practice and 
use. 


SECTION II. 

Bur we cannot express to another what 
passes in our own mind any otherwise than 
by words : It is therefore by teaching us the 
proper use of words, that logic assists the 
mind, 1. To apprehend distinctly: 2. To 
judge truly : o. To discourse conclusively. 

It should be confessed, that it teaches the two 
former only accidentally ; if it taught them inva¬ 
riably and necessarily, mankind could never err. 

A word is defined to be an arbitrary vicarious 
sign of a thing, or of an idea, used by common 
consent. Sounds, therefore, which are suggested 
by nature, as groans and shrieks, are not words. 

A word that expresses simple apprehen¬ 
sion is called a simple word ; one that 

b 2 



4 


COMPENDIUM 


expresses judgment, a complex or com¬ 
pounded word; * one that expresses dis¬ 
course, a decomplex or twice compounded 
one. 

Since, from the definition of judgment, the 
word expressive of it must consist of some com¬ 
bination of simple words, the term complex word 
has arisen. 

For every argument is resolvable into 
three propositions, or sentences ; and every 
proposition contains three words, in sense, if 
not in number, 1. The subject, or that of 
which something else is said: 2. The pre¬ 
dicate, or that which is said : And, 3. The 
copulative, which stands between the subject 
and predicate, which are therefore called the 
terms of the proposition. 

Any combination of grammatical words, which 
represents only one idea, however compound, is 
logically only one word ; as, “ the-single-consider- 
ation - of- the - progress-of- a- finite - spirit - to wards- 
perfection.” 

The following is the example of a proposition : 

subject copula predicate 

‘‘The righteous man—is—blessed in his end.” 
term. term. 

* St. Paul says, (Acts xxiv. 21,) “Except it be for 
tliis one voice,” (in the Latin vox, which also signifies a 
word,) “ that I cried,” &c. To what kind of logical words 
did the apostle, in all probability, refer ? 


OF LOGIC. 


O 


Sometimes the copula is grammatically combined 
with the predicate; as, “kings reign;” which 
may be logically resolved, “ kings—are—reigning 
persons.” 

The apparent or grammatical subject is not always 
the logical subject in a proposition : In deciding 
which is, we must consider the general scope of 
the argument. The subject ought logically to be 
the first word in every proposition, and the pre¬ 
dicate the last; but this is not always the case ; 
for it frequently increases the force of the asser¬ 
tion to put the predicate first; as, “ Blessed are 
the poor in spirit.” It may be remarKed, that 
an infinitive is never the predicate, unless there 
be another infinitive as the subject; thus, “ I hope 
to succeed,” is logically expressed, “ To succeed 
—is—what I hope.” The word “ it ” frequently 
serves as the representative of the subject when 
that is put last; as, 

predicate. subject. 

“ It is to be hoped—that we shall succeed ” 


SECTION III. 

The first part of logic treats of simple 
terms, that is, such words as may, by them¬ 
selves, be the subject or predicate of a pro¬ 
position. 

These are also called Categorematic words : 

b 3 



COMPENDIUM 


fi 

Such are all nouns substantive in the nominative 
case, and verbs in the infinitive mood. Syncate- 
gorematic words are such as can only be part of a 
subject or a predicate ; as, adjectives, participles, 
and adverbs. Mixed words may be formed by the 
combination of the two other species; as, “I walk.” 
Here, “ walk ” is a mixed word, and is resolved, 
“ am—a walking person” It may be properly ob¬ 
served in this place, that there is but one verb in 
logic, which is the copula, the substantive verb 
“ to be” in the present tense. 

The logical noun is equivalent to a simple 
term or categorem; it is defined “ a significant 
word inexpressive of relation or time.” 

Of these, namely, simple terms, or logical 
nouns, there are several divisions ; as,— 

1. A singular word, which expresses one 
thing only; as, 4 ‘ Socrates : ” A common, 
which expresses many and each of them ; as, 
“ a man.” 

Common nouns are sometimes used as singu¬ 
lar ; as, “He is gone to the river ; ” meaning some 
particular stream. “ The noble lord who spoke 
last; ” where the word “ noble lord ” is limited to 
one individual. Singular nouns are often made 
common, by extending their signification to 
several individuals; as, “the village Hampdens” 
“ some mute, inglorious Milton” 

2. An infinite word, to which the particle 
“ not” is prefixed ; as, <£ not-a man,” which 


OF LOGIC. 


/ 

may imply any tiling besides: A finite, to 
which that particle is not prefixed. 

The modern English terms which express this 
division, are Definite and Indefinite. 

o. A positive word, which expresses a 
thing as present: A privative, which ex¬ 
presses its absence from a subject capable 
of it: A negative, which expresses its absence 
from a subject not capable of it. So, 44 see¬ 
ing,* 1 spoken of a man, is a positive word; 
44 blind, 11 spoken of a man, is a privative, 
but spoken of a stone, a negative, word. 

These and the following divisions denote not so 
much distinct kinds or classes of nouns, as 
different uses or applications to which words are 
subject. 

4. An univocal word, whose one significa¬ 
tion equally agrees to several things ; as, 44 a 
man : 11 An equivocal, whose different signi¬ 
fications agree equally ; as, 44 a foot: 11 An 
analogous, whose one signification agrees un¬ 
equally; as, “knowledge applied to God 
and man. 11 

The example of an equivocal word is erroneous: 
Foot is an analogous word ; as, “ the foot of a 
table,” “ the foot of a horse ; ” where the supporter 
of a table is so called from its bearing an analogy 
to the supporter of ahorse. So “ foot ” is ana¬ 
logously applied to the measure of twelve inches. 


8 


COMPENDIUM 


because about the length of a human foot. Mr. 
Wesley, no doubt, while translating from Aldrich, 
observed pes given as an example of the analogous 
words, and inadvertently placed it with the equi¬ 
vocal. It may be observed, that puns and similar 
expressions imply the use of equivocal words. 
“ Sting,” of an animal, of conscience, of an 
epigram, is an instance of an analogous word. 

5 . An absolute word, which expresses a 
thing considered as by itself; as, “justice : ” 
A connotative, which expresses the same 
thing as joined to another; as, “ just.” 

An absolute word, expressing a thing as 
separate from its subject, is also called an 
abstract; as, “justice : ” And a connotative, 
expressing it as joined to a subject, a concrete 
word ; as, “ just.” 

Abstraction is the mental drawing off, or sepa- 
tion, of certain qualities or circumstances belong¬ 
ing to a subject, or class of subjects, and, while 
we withhold our notice from the rest, attending 
exclusively to them alone. Generalization, though 
it implies abstraction, is different from it. It is 
defined, “ the act of comprehending under a com¬ 
mon name several objects agreeing in some point 
which we abstract from each of them, and which 
that common name serves to indicate.” 

Those connotative words which imply each 
other are termed relatives ; as, “ a father,” 
and, “ a son.” 


OP LOGIC. 


9 


But to understand a relative noun we must 
have a notion of its correlative. “ Husband and 
wife,” “large and little,” are relatives. Some 
correlatives have the same name ; as, “ brother,” 
“ cousin.” 

6. Consistent words, which may at the 
same time be affirmed of the same thing; as, 
“ cold," and, “ dry : " Opposite, which can- 
not; as, “ black," and, “ white." 

The opposition of simple terms is fourfold : 
1. Relative, between relative terms, as, “a 
father," and, “ a son : " 2. Contrary, be¬ 
tween contrary terms, that is, absolute words, 
which expel one another from a subject capable 
of either; as, “black," and, “white:" 3. 
Privative, between a privative and a positive 
word ; as, u seeing," and, “ blind : " 4. Con¬ 
tradictory, between a positive and a negative 
word ; as, “ a man," and, “ not-a-man." This 
is the greatest of all oppositions, as admitting 
of no medium ; neither a medium of parti¬ 
cipation, such as is gray, between black and 
white ; nor a medium of abnegation, such 
as is a stone, between seeing and blind. 
Relative opposition, on the other hand, is 
the least of all : For relative terms are not 
opposites, unless they are considered with 
respect to the same thing. 


10 


COMPENDIUM 


7. A word of the first intention is one used in 
its common popular signification. The second 
intention of a word is its exact and definite sense, 
limited as may be required, when it is used for 
any particular science and art. Thus the Greek 
word cnr6<TToAos in its primary intention is a mes¬ 
senger ; in its second, an apostle. 

Of these divisions of logical nouns, three are 
most necessary to be observed; namely, the 
common, univocal, and noun of the second inten¬ 
tion, because the union of these three forms what 
is termed a predicable. 


SECTION IV. 

An univocal word is otherwise called a 
predicable, or a word capable of being predi¬ 
cated, that is, spoken in the same sense of 
several things. 

There are five sorts of predicable words : 
1. A genus, which is predicated of several 
things as the common part of their essence ; 
as, an “ animal: ” 2. A difference, which is 
predicated of several things as the distinguish¬ 
ing part of their essence ; as, 44 rational: ” 

3. A species, which is predicated of several 
things as their whole essence ; as, 44 a man : ” 

4. A property, which is predicated of several 
things as necessarily joined to their essence ; 



OF LOGIC. 


11 


as, “ risible : 11 * 5. An accident, 'which is 
predicated of several things as accidentally 
joined to their essence ; as, “ tall,” “short/ 1 

Before, however, we can certainly arrive at 
this information, it is necessary to premise, that 
a singular noun is also termed in Logic indivisi¬ 
ble : But nevertheless whatever can be called one 
is not necessarily singular; for many things that 
possess common qualities, may, as far as the 
resemblance goes, be termed one in sense, though 
not one in number. Every thing that actually 
exists is undoubtedly singular ; but these objects 
are so numerous, that it would be burdensome 
to appropriate a separate and singular name to 
each. Suppose, for instance, we tvere in the 

* Is this a property ? Whately acutely remarks, “ Logical 
writers have also added a fourth kind of property ; viz., 
that which is peculiar to a species, and belongs to every 
individual of it, but not at every time. But this is in fact 
a contradiction ; since whatever does not always belong to 
a species, does not belong to it universally . It is through 
the ambiguity of words that they have fallen into this con¬ 
fusion of thought; e. g., the example commonly given is, 
homini canescere , ‘to become grey/ being, they say, 
(though it is not) peculiar to man, and belonging to every 
individual, though not always, but only in old age, &c. 
Now, if by canescere be meant the very state of 
becoming grey, this manifestly does not belong to every 
man : If, again, it be meant to signify the liability to become 
gray hereafter, this does not belong always to man. And 
the same in other instances. Indeed, the very Proprium 
fixed on by Aldrich, e risibility/ is nearly parallel to the 
above. Rian is alivays i capable of laughing ; ’ but he is not 
‘ capable of laughing always.”’. —Whately’s Logic, Book 
ii., cap. 5, § 4. 


12 


COMPENDIUM 


midst of a large assembly, and wanted to assert 
the fact that many persons were present, it would 
be an endless task to repeat, John Doe, Richard 
Roe, and all the singular names of the rest, even 
supposing we knew them. To remedy this and 
similar difficulties, the operation termed “abstrac¬ 
tion” is used; which is defined to be “ that faculty 
of the mind by which, in the contemplation of 
many singulars or individuals, it neglects all those 
points in which the singulars differ from each 
other, regarding those only in which they agree.” 
Thus an abstract idea would be formed, wffiich, 
from its nature, is universal; and we should say, 
thousands of men were present. 

The following is an instance of the process of 
abstraction. Here are the individuals, John, 
Richard, and James. I remove from my mind 
the notions of their sitting or standing, or being 
born in London or not, &c., and I arrive at the 
common nature, in which they all agree, that is 
man. I separate from man his capability of 
laughter, his reasoning powers, his capability of 
religion and contemplation of the Deity, and l 
come to the general notion of animal. Thus I 
proceed until 1 arrive at the most inclusive or 
highest genera, matter and substance. 

Let us take other examples. By abstracting 
from Barrow, Howe, Baxter, Stillingfleet, and 
Paley, all the various circumstances in which they 
differ from each other,—such, for instance, as 
their conformity or nonconformity, &c. &c., I 
arrive at the general notion expressed by the 
common noun theologian. From the blue sky, a 


OF LOGIC. 


13 


blue coat, blue in the rainbow, and a blue flower, 
I derive the abstract idea of blue. 

Now this universal nature is capable of being 
affirmatively predicated or said of all the indivi¬ 
duals from which it has been derived ; hence it 
acquires another name. Predicable. 

A Predicable, as has already been implied, is 
defined to be, “ a common univocal noun of the 
second intention ; ” common, because applicable to 
many individuals ; univocal, because the repre¬ 
sentative of only one idea ; of the second intention, 
because a w'ord thus applied is not used in a vague 
and colloquial, but a limited and definite, sense 

A Predicable, then, as being a v r ord that can be 
affirmed of several things, must express either 
their whole essence, or a part of their essence, or 
something joined to their essence. Their whole 
essence is called the species. There are two parts 
of their essence; either the material part, which 
is termed the genus, or the formal and distinguish- 
ingpart, which is called differentia, or, in common 
discourse, the characteristic part. That which is 
joined to the essence is either necessarily joined, 
(that is, to the whole species, or, in other words, 
universally to every individual of it,) which is de¬ 
nominated a property : Or else it is accidentally, 
contingently joined, (that is, to some individuals 
only of the species,) which is an accident. Thus 
it is evident, from wdiat has been said, that the 
genus and difference put together make up the 
species : For instance, “rational” and “animal” 
constitute “ man ” 

Genus is predicated, or spoken, of many things 

c 


14 


COMPENDIUM 


differing in species; that is, it is predicated of 
those different species which it includes under its 
more extensive signification ; as, “animal,” is pre¬ 
dicated of men, beasts, birds, fishes, and insects. 

Species is predicated of things differing from 
each other in number. 

Difference, property, and accident, are predi¬ 
cated of things differing as well in number as in 
species ; because they have a relation either to a 
genus or a species. 

Genus is called a logical whole, because it is that 
term which has the most extensive signification ; 
for it may be affirmatively predicated of all its 
contained species. Species is a metaphysical whole, 
because the abstract notion denominated a species 
is a complex or aggregate idea; and is therefore 
dissolvible into its component parts.* 

Genus and species are commonly said to be 
predicated in quid (ri), that is, to answer to the 
question “What?” as, “What is Caesar?” An¬ 
swer, “A man;” “What is a man?” Answer, 
“ An animal: ” Difference, in quale quid , ttoiovti : 
Property and accident, in quale, troiov. 

* “ But when logicians speak of species as a i whole,’ 
this is, properly, in reference to the genus and the differ¬ 
ence ; each of which denotes a part of that species which 
we constitute by joining those two together. But then it 
should he remembered, that a species is not a predicable , 
in respect of its genus and difference, (since it cannot he 
predicated of them,) hut only in respect of the individuals 
or lower species of which it can be predicated.’ - — 
Whately, ii. cap. 5, § 4. 


OF LOGIC 


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Universal , anc? 
peculiar. 















COMPENDIUM 


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SECTION V. 

A genus is either the highest or a subal¬ 
tern : A species is either a subaltern or 
the lowest. The highest genus is that which 



OF LOGIC. 


17 

is never a species ; tlie lowest species, that 
which is never a genus. A subaltern genus, 
or species, is a genus when predicated of a 
lower species; as, 44 Every man is an animal: ” 
but it is a species, when subjected to ahigher 
genus ; as, “ Every animal is a substance.” 

Summum genus* cannot be the subject of any 
cognate f genus. It is the highest and most ex¬ 
tensive term that can be imagined. Infima, or 
lowest species, on the contrary, may be the subject 
of any cognate genus. It is the first common 
nature that results from any abstraction. All the 

* The general heads, or summa genera, to some of which 
we may refer every term, are called predicaments, or cate¬ 
gories. Archytas first tanght the doctrine of them ; and 
it was adopted by Aristotle from him. They are ten in 
number : 1. Substance ; either material or immaterial. 
2. Quantity; either continuous , as, lines, solids, or time ; 
or discrete , as number, &c. 3. Quality ; either innate ; as, 
the natural faculties : Or acquired, as learning : Or sensible, 
as, form, sounds, colour. 4. Relation; including the two 
correlatives and the principle of the relation. 5. Action. 
6. Passion; including the transition from one place to 
another, or from one state to another. 7. Place. 8. Time, 
past, present, future. 9. Posture, whether quiescent or active. 
10. Habit or covering ; proper , as, dress to man, skin to 
beasts; or figurative , as leaves to trees. The following 
are the Greek terms given to the categories by Aristotle, 
ovcr'iaf 7 tSctov, ttoiov, irpos n, irov, 7 Tore, KtiaQai, ex ei,/ » 
Troieiv, TTdcryjiv. The categories are of especial importance 
to theologians, as furnishing innumerable topics of argu¬ 
ment and illustration. 

t By the term cognate genera are meant, those which 
are drawn by repeated abstraction from the same indivi¬ 
duals : thus, corporeal, animate, sensitive, &c., are said to 
he cognate to man, and inanimate, insensitive, See., to stones. 

c 3 


18 


COMPENDIUM 


intermediate notions, and the words which express 
them, are denominated subaltern. Each is higher 
than some, and lower than others ; each may be 
used as a predicate comprehending some terms 
less abstract, and as the subject included in some 
more abstract cognate terms; each is a genus in 
relation to some lower species, and a species in 
relation to some higher genus. 

The following table represents these subdivi¬ 
sions : 

Summum, or the highest genus, can never be¬ 
come a species. 

Injima, or the lowest species, can never become 
a genus. 

Subaltern genus may be a subaltern species. 

Subaltern species may be a subaltern genus. 

There is, however, no actual difference between 
subaltern genus and subaltern species; the dis¬ 
tinction is only relative. Thus the general name 
“ predicable,” and each of the classes of predica¬ 
bles, (namely, genus, species, &c.,) are relative; 
that is, we cannot say what predicable any term 
is, or whether it is any at all, unless it be speci¬ 
fied of what it is to be predicated : For instance, 
the term “red ” would be considered a genus, in 
relation to the terms “ pink,” “ scarlet,” &c.; it 
might be regarded as the differentia, in relation to 
“red rose;”—as the property of “blood,”—as 
an accident of “a house,” &c. 

What has been said on this subject may be ap¬ 
propriately illustrated by a scale, called the Por- 
phyrian tree, because Porphyry adopted it for a 
different purpose. 


OF LOGIC. 


19 










20 


COMPENDIUM 


Wherefore, a difference is either generi- 
cal, which, added to the genus, constitutes a 
subaltern species ; as, “sensible: ” Or specific, 
which constitutes the lowest species; as, 
“ rational.’” 

Generic difference is so called, because that 
species which it constitutes may be considered as 
a subaltern genus; and, consequently, the generic 
difference can be affirmatively predicated of every 
species which is comprehended under it: Hence, 
it is predicated cf things which differ from each 
other in species; for instance, sensitive is a generic 
difference to man, and it may be predicated of all 
animals as w r ell as of man. 

It is often difficult to distinguish the difference 
and the specific property; in cases where any 
doubt arises, we must carefully remember, that a 
property is only joined to an essence and results 
from it; whereas difference is the very consti¬ 
tuting part of the essence. 

A property, likewise, is either generical, 
which is necessarily joined to the essence of an 
highest or subaltern genus ; as, “movable 
Or specific, which is joined to that of any 
lowest species ; as, u risible.’” 

The distinction of property, as generic or spe¬ 
cific, is of the same nature with that of differ¬ 
ence. 

But a property is vulgarly said to be four¬ 
fold : 1. Such as belongs to one species 


OF LOGIC. 


21 


only, but not to every individual of it; as, 
“to be a grammarian :*” 2. Such as belongs to 
every individual of a species, but not of that 
species only ; as, “ to have two feet: ” 3. Such 
as belongs to one species and every individual, 
but not always ; as, “ to turn gray-haired : ” 
4. Such as belongs to every individual of 
one species only, and that always ; as, “ risi¬ 
bility.’" It is such a property as this which 
constitutes the fourth predicable. 

It has already been hinted, (see the note from Arch¬ 
bishop Whately at page 11,) that the first and third 
of these classes cannot properly be termed proper¬ 
ties, though usually denominated so by logicians. 
It is necessary to property, that it be universal, 
that is, applicable to all the individuals of a spe¬ 
cies ; and it must belong to that species necessa¬ 
rily. This, however, cannot be said of the in¬ 
stance adduced by Aldrich, and copied into the 
text; for we have sufficient proof that some men 
are not grammarians. The third class, for the 
same reason, cannot be called a property;—a 
mere act is not a property. 

5. Accident is also divided into two kinds; 
namely, separable and inseparable. Separable acci¬ 
dent is so called, because it may be separated from 
the individual; as, “ walking,” “ riding,”—that 
is, he may sit down, or recline. Inseparable acci¬ 
dent is so called, because it is not separable from 
the individual; as, “to have been born in London,” 
It might be quite accidental that a man should or 


22 


COMPENDIUM 


should not be born in a particular place; but 
when he has been so born, it is an accident inse¬ 
parable from him for ever. Thus every past 
event is an inseparable accident; dress, posture, 
residence, &c., are separable. 


SECTION VI. 

To divide a common word is, to enumer¬ 
ate its several significations. So he is said to 
divide the word “ animal, 1 ’’ who says, “ It sig¬ 
nifies either a man or a brute. 11 Division is 
therefore a distinct enumeration of several 
things signified under one common name. 

This is analogous to the division of a whole 
into its parts; yet the two kinds of division, 
physical and logical, are totally distinct in their 
nature, and must not be confounded. The phy¬ 
sical * division of a tree, for instance, consists of 
its distribution into root, trunk , branches, leaves, 
and fruit, of a book into leaves, cover, back j but 
the logical division of tree is into fruit-tree, tim¬ 
ber-tree, &c. The criterion of logical division is 
this, that the whole divided can be predicated of 
each of its dividing parts. Thus “book” might be 
logically divided into folios, quartos, octavos, fyc., 

* Singular nouns can only be divided physically; as, 
“ James” can only be divided into his component parts, 
body, legs, arms, &c. 



OF LOGIC. 


23 


as it might be predicated of all folios, &c., that 
they were books. 

But there is also another species of division, 
which is termed metaphysical. This is the analy¬ 
sis of the more simple ideas which form the com¬ 
ponent parts of a complex idea. Thus “ repent¬ 
ance” has been divided into conviction, contrition, 
confession, and forsaking of sin. This process 
may be distinguished from logical division in the 
same way as physical division. 

The rules of division are three :— 

1. Let the members of the division seve¬ 
rally contain less (be of a narrower significa¬ 
tion) than the word divided. 

Thus, if the word hound were divided into grey, 
hound, dog , bloodhound, &c., this rule would be 
broken ; for the word dog would be more exten¬ 
sive than the whole divided, or hound. 

2. Let them (that is, the members of the 
division) conjointly contain neither more 
nor less than the divided. 

Therefore, we must be careful to ascertain that 
the summum genus may be predicated of every 
term placed under it, and of nothing else. 

3. Let them (that is, the members of the 
division) be opposite, that is, not contained 
in each other. 

Thus, if you were to divide book into poetical, 
historical, folio, quarto, French, Latin, &c*, the 


24 


COMPENDIUM 


members of your division would not be opposed, 
but contained under each other ; a folio might be 
a French book, &c. You must be careful, there¬ 
fore, to keep in mind the principle of division 
with which you set out; as, whether you begin 
dividing books according to their matter, their 
language, or their size, &c. 


SECTION VII. 

Definition follows division: It is a 
sentence explaining the word defined. 

Literally, definition signifies “ the laying down 
the boundary of any thing;” but in logic it is 
used to signify “a sentence explanatory of a term, 
so as to separate that term from any other, and 
thus limit or bound its signification.” Defini¬ 
tion has two objects in view, viz., either the 
conveying to the mind of the reader or hearer the 
precise idea which the defined term is intended 
to represent, or else the correction of any indis¬ 
tinct notion, which may have been wrongly 
assigned to it. The first object presupposes that 
the hearer does not at all understand the meaning 
of the word; the second, that it conveys an idea 
to his mind different from that which was 
intended. 

Definition is either nominal, which tells 
the derivation of the word ; or real, which 
explains the nature of the thing. 



OF LOGIC. 


25 


Nominal definition would be mo r e properly 
defined, “ that which tells the signification of tlie 
word.” The definition in tlie text would imply 
that all nominal definitions were necessarily etymo¬ 
logical. Such, however, is not the case, nor is it 
supposed that Aldrich thought so ; for Wallis (from 
whose work his is almost entirely abridged) express¬ 
ly asserts the contrary. Nominal definitions are 
such as are usually found in dictionaries. They 
are generally used when the word to be defined 
does not convey any idea whatever to the mind 
of the hearer, and when in consequence he does 
not understand the meaning of the term. “ Em¬ 
blem,” defined as the sign of anything,—“ de¬ 
calogue,” as the ten commandments,—“ essence,” 
as universal nature,—are instances of nominal 
definition. In many cases the nominal and real 
essence of any thing exactly coincide, viz., the 
idea conveyed by the word is exactly the same 
as the nature of the thing. Thus a triangle is 
“that which has three angles,” which is both a 
nominal and real definition. 

Again : A real definition is either acci¬ 
dental, which assigns the properties or acci¬ 
dents of the defined ; or essential, which 
assigns those parts that constitute the essence 
of it. 

In common conversation, accidental definition is 
termed description. It is more frequently used, 
perhaps, than any of the others, because we are 
often ignorant of the component or natural parts 

D 


26 


COMPENDIUM 


of a thing, and still more so of the metaphysical 
parts. Thus we might define tree, “ that which 
shoots out leafy branches ; ” dog, “ an animal 
most faithful to man.” Individuals, and the 
sumrnum genus, can only be defined at all acci¬ 
dentally. 

Lastly: An essential definition is either 
logical, which assigns the genus and differ¬ 
ence ; or physical, which assigns the really 
distinct parts of its essence ; for the genus 
and difference are only distinguished by the 
understanding. 

Physical definition is that which assigns the 
natural and constituent parts of each individual 
comprehended under the common name. These 
parts admit of real separation. Thus a house 
might be physically defined a “ building com¬ 
posed of chimneys, roofs, ceiling, walls,” &c.; 
a horse, “ a being consisting of head, body, legs, 
and tail.” 

Metaphysical or logical definition is that 
which lays down the imaginary and metaphysical 
parts, which complete the abstract notion repre¬ 
sented by the word. This, therefore, gives the 
genus and the difference. Logical definitions are 
the most perfect. Belief, defined to be assent 
produced by apparent credibility,— Plant, an 
organized being destitute of sensation,— Proposi¬ 
tion, a declaratory sentence,—are instances of 
logical definition. 


OF LOGIC. 


27 


Definition is 
Nominal 

'"Accidental 

Real < r Physical 

Essential < 

Metaphysical 

For example : Homo is defined nominally, 
qui ex humo ; accidentally, an nnfeathered, 
two-legged animal; logically, a rational ani¬ 
mal ; physically, a being consisting of an 
organized body, and a reasonable soul. 

The rules of definition are three : 1. Let 
the definition be adequate to the defined. 

That is, exactly equal; neither too extensive nor 
too limited. Thus, if " tree” were to be defined “ a 
plant having leaves,” such a definition would be 
too extensive ; for many plants have leaves, which 
are not trees: In this case the definition explains 
a whole, when the term defined is but a part. 
On the other hand, if religious jjerson was defined 
to be " one who holds the peculiar doctrines of 
Calvin,” the definition would be too narrow, for 
there are many religious persons who reject those 
doctrines. 

2. Let it be clearer and plainer than the 
defined. 

Dr. Johnson’s celebrated definition of "net¬ 
work” seems to offend against this rule ; though it 
may be said in its defence, that words expressing 
simple ideas are of themselves and intrinsically 

n 2 



28 


COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 


more intelligible, than those expressive of com¬ 
pound ideas. 

3. Let it be contained in a fit number of 
proper (not figurative) words. 

For from metaphorical words indistinctness 
and ambiguity arise; too great brevity and con¬ 
ciseness are apt to produce obscurity ; and pro¬ 
lixity, on the other hand, causes confusion. 

The following definitions err against this rule : 

“ Judgment is that operation, by which the 
mind, seated on a tribunal, passes sentence upon 
the agreement or disagreement of any two 
objects.” 

“ A chariot is a vehicle.” 

“ Astrology is that curious science, so much in 
vogue during the middle ages, which instructs 
mankind in the supposed influence which the 
stars possess over human circumstances and 
actions, and by which they rule and direct the 
world.” 


CHAPTER II. 


OK PROPOSITIONS. 


SECTION I. 

The second part of Logic treats of pro¬ 
positions, which is judgment expressed in 
words. 

A regular proposition is an affirmative or 
negative sentence.* 

It must be of this character, as far as regards 
the words ; which is its essence. 

Signifying either true or false. 

That is, as to the sense, it must declare either 
a fact or not a fact : This is its property. 

Not ambiguous; for then it would be 
sentences. 

* “ The sentence which expresses judgment is called 
‘ a proposition ; ’ now the agreement or disagreement of 
any two objects (the decision of which belongs to judg¬ 
ment) cannot be expressed in words, except by affirma¬ 
tion, oy negation; namely, by some assertion; consequently, 
it is necessary, in order to constitute a proposition, that it 
must he a sentence which sffirms or denies ; therefore, its 
affirming, or denying, distinguishes it from any other kind 
of sentence, and is its difference.'’— Huyshe’s Logic, p. 47. 

D 3 



30 


COMPENDIUM 


That is, more than one sentence, and would 
admit of more constructions than one. That 
which, is ambiguous has more than one meaning, 
and that which has more than one meaning must 
be in reality several propositions. Ambiguity 
arises from a dubious construction of sentence or 
equivocal sense of language, particularly in the 
use of negative and exceptive particles.* 

Nor maimed; for then it would have no 
signification. 

The ungrammatical expressions of illiterate peo¬ 
ple are logically unintelligible; because in them there 
is not a subject, copula, and predicate, expressed or 
obviously implied. It must be recollected, how¬ 
ever, that some sentences, such as proverbs, 
which appear maimed, are not really so. They 
are incomplete in form, but not in sense. Of 
these, “ A word to the wise,” is an instance. 

It (a proposition) is either categorical, 
which pronounces a thing absolutely; as, 
44 Plato is happy : 11 Or hypothetical, which 
pronounces conditionally ; as, “ If he is wise, 
then he is happy. 11 

A proposition is thus divided according to its 
substance ; that is, its being a sentence. 

The categorical proposition is divided again 
into two kinds, pure and modal. The pure cate- 

* For instance, the particle “only as, “AVe only went 
by that road.” “ Brahmins eat only vegetables.” “ He only 
goes to show his skill.” Here only is used in three differ¬ 
ent senses. 


OF LOGIC. 


31 


gorical proposition asserts simply, that the subject 
does or does not agree with the predicate; as, 
“Vice destroys health.” The modal expresses 
the mode or manner in which the subject is con¬ 
tained in the predicate; as, “Vice probably destroys 
health.” “ It is not possible that an unholy man 
can enter heaven.” If the proposition is qualified 
by words expressing necessity, possibility, im¬ 
possibility, improbability, probability, &c., it is 
modal. 

Hypothetical propositions are either conditional; 
as, “The man who disturbs the peace of a religious 
society will, if he do not heartily repent, have 
much to answer for at the last day: ” Or disjunc¬ 
tive ; as, “ This result is the effect either of truth, 
which produces consistency without the writer’s 
thought or care, or of a contexture of forgeries 
confirming and falling in with one another by a 
species of fortuity, of which I know no exam¬ 
ple.” Horce Paulina, viii., § 4, 

Again : A proposition is either affirmative 
or negative; and is either true or false : This 
is called the quality of it. 

Propositions are affirmative or negative by 
their essential quality, or property ; and true or 
false by their accidental quality, or the quality of 
the matter. 

Lastly : It (a proposition) is either uni¬ 
versal ; as, c< All men are animals : 11 Or parti¬ 
cular ; as, “ Some men are learned." 1 This is 
called the quantity of it. 


32 


COMPENDIUM 


The quantity of a proposition is “ the extent” to 
which the subject is contained in the predicate. 
Propositions are also divided according to their 
quantity into singular and indefinite. A singular 
proposition is one whose subject is either a pro¬ 
per name, or a common name with a singular 
sign; as, “ Wesley was a man of unbounded 
energy. This man deserves the thanks of the 
community.” These are reckoned as universals, 
because when we speak of an individual we 
mean the whole of him. Though singulars may, 
as Whately observes, be considered particulars, 
when some qualifying word is inserted, which 
indicates that you are not speaking of the whole of 
the'subject; as, “ Caesar was not wholly a tyrant.” 
Indefinite propositions are those which, with 
common terms for their subject, are not distin¬ 
guished by any sign, to denote their universality 
or particularity. These must be decided accord¬ 
ing to their obvious sense ; as, “ Men are gram¬ 
marians : ” “ Men die; ” that is. Some men are 
grammarians : All men die. 

Strictly speaking, therefore, there are but two 
kinds of propositions, considered in relation to 
their quantity; that is, universal and particular. 

Observe : Propositions are divided 

According to their Substance into 
Categorical. Hypothetical. 


Pure. 

♦Modal. 


Conditional. 

Disjunctive. 




OF LOGIC. 


33 


According to tlieir Quality into 


Accidental. 

Essential. 

True. 

Affirmative. 

False. 

Negative. 

According to their Quantity into 


Universal 

Particular. 

Singular. 

Indefinite. 


SECTION II. 

A is put for an universal affirmative pro¬ 
position ; E, for an universal negative ; I, 
for a particular affirmative ; O, for a particu¬ 
lar negative. 

In an universal affirmative the subject 
only is distributed : (That is, taken in its 
full sense :) In a particular negative, only the 
predicate : In a particular affirmative, neither 
term is distributed : In an universal negative, 
both. 

Accidentally, the predicate of an affirmative is 
distributed, that is, taken in its widest sense; but 





34 


COMPENDIUM 


not necessarily. This accidental distribution 
takes place in the case of logical definitions ; as, 
“ Every man is a rational animal. Every rational 
animal is a man.” But it must be remembered, 
that, in logic, we only regard the form of the 
expression, and not the subject-matter 

The following are prepositions in A E I 0 :— 

A 

All mankind have sinned. 

Christ tasted death for every man. 

All mankind may be saved. 

The meek shall inherit the earth. 

Every religious man is also a true patriot. 

E 

No wicked man is happy. 

The Duke has not returned. 

Afflictions cannot be pleasing to human nature. 

I 

There have been men improperly appointed. 

Books are profitable companions. 

Some animals are graminivorous. 

O 

Some actions are necessarily displeasing to God. 

Many animals are not graminivorous. 

There are creatures which are not responsible. 

The matter of a proposition (that is, the 
manner wherein the terms cohere) is either, 


OP LOGIC. 


35 


1. Necessary, when they essentially agree; 
or, 2. Impossible, when they essentially 
differ ; or, 3. Contingent, when they agree 
or differ accidentally. 

The truth or falsehood of a proposition de¬ 
pends upon the matter; hence. 


f Affirmatives,—true. 
I Negatives,—false. 


In necessary matter j 
In impossible matter -j 


J Affirmatives,—false. 
1 Negatives,—true. 


Universals,—false. 
Particulars,—true. 



SECTION III. 


Those propositions are said to be opposed, 
which, having the same subjects and predi¬ 
cates, differ in quantity or quality, or both. 

Opposition of propositions consists in the dif¬ 
ference between any two categorical propositions 
which are composed of the same terms, but vary 
from each other in quantity only, (namely, when 
one is universal, and the other particular,) or in 
essential quality only, (when one is affirmative, 
and the other negative,) or in both quantity and 
quality. 



30 


COMPENDIUM 


The whole doctrine of opposition is con¬ 
tained in this scheme :— 



Here A E I O, are four propositions 
marked according to their quantity and qua¬ 
lity, which are, t f, true or false, as the matter 
of the proposition is n i c, necessary, im¬ 
possible, or contingent. Hence, it is easy, 
1. To enumerate the species of opposition, 
which are contradictory, contrary, subcon¬ 
trary, and subaltern. 2. To define each. 
For example : Contradictory opposition is 











OF LOGIC. 


37 


Uiat 'which is between two categorical propo¬ 
sitions, differing both in quantity and qua- 
lity, See. *J. To lay down the rules of op¬ 
posites as follow:— 

(1) Contradictory propositions are never 
both true, or both false; but always one 
true, the other false. 

As, All men are responsible ; some men are net 
responsible.” Here the propositions differ, both in 
quantity and quality, which is the greatest possi¬ 
ble opposition. 

But observe : Four things are required to 
make a contradiction ; namely, to speak of 
the same thing, (i.) In the same sense : (ii.) 
In the same respect: (iii.) With regard to 
the same third thing : And, (iv.) At the 
same time. If any of these conditions be 
wanting, 44 is,” and, “ is not,” may agree. For 
instance : (i.) 44 An opinion is and is not 

faith. It is a dead faith ; it is not a living 
faith.” (ii.) 44 Zoilus is and is not red-haired. 
He is, with respect to his head; he is not, 
with respect to his beard.” (iii.) 44 Socrates is 
and is not long-haired. He is, in compari¬ 
son of Scipio ; he is not, in comparison of 
Xenophon. 1 (iv.) 44 Solomon is and is not a 
good man. He is, in his youth ; he is "Hot, 
in his middle age.” 


E 


38 


COMPENDIUM 


(2.) Contrary propositions are never both 
true : But in the contingent matter they are 
both false. 

As, “ All men possess animal life ; no man pos¬ 
sesses animal Iffe.” “ All men are black ; no man 
is black.” In the former case, one or the other 
proposition must be false. In the latter, of which 
the matter is contingent, both are false. 

(3.) Subcontraries are never both false : 
But in the contingent matter they are both 
true. 

As, “ Some men have been martyred ; some men 
have not been martyred.” Here, the matter being 
contingent, both are true. “ Some men are ani¬ 
mals ; some men are not animals.” Here, one is 
true. 

(4.) Subalterns are sometimes both true, 
sometimes both false; sometimes one true, 
the other false. 

As, “ All human laws are imperfect; some human 
laws are imperfect,” &c. &c. 


SECTION IV. 

A proposition is said to be converted 
when its terms are transposed. This is done 
either, 1. Simply, when neither the quantity 
nor quality; or, 2. Accidentally, when the 
quantity is changed. 



OF LOGIC. 


39 


No conversion is useful in Logic, unless it be 
illative; that is, when the truth of the converse 
follows from the truth of the original proposition ; 
as, “ Earths are not metals; therefore, metals are 
not earths.” 

Every term distributed in the converted propo¬ 
sition must have been also distributed in the 
original one; for if this be not the case, a term 
will be used partially in the one proposition, and 
universally in the other; as, ‘‘All men are animals; 
all animals are men.” Here a term (animals) is 
distributed in the converse, which was not in the 
first proposition : It is evidently false; for all ani¬ 
mals are not men ; some, for instance, are horses, 
cows, &c. Observe, 

An universal negative, or a particular af¬ 
firmative, may be simply converted, and the 
inference will hold. An universal affirmative 
must be converted accidentally, or the in¬ 
ference will not hold. 

So A is converted accidentally, or by limitation, 
to I. 

{ Simply to E. 

Accidentally, or by limit¬ 
ation, to O. 

I is converted simply to I. 

The following are examples of the conversion of 
true propositions in E. 

Nothing morally wrong is politically right. 
Nothing politically right is morally wrong. 

E 2 


40 


COMPENDIUM 


No evil enterprise will be finally successful. 

Nothing that is finally successful is an evil 
enterprise. 

No infidel is a true lover of God. 

No true lover of God is an infidel. 

In A to I. 

All mankind are subject to death. 

Some beings subject to death are men. 

All real piety promotes cheerfulness. 

Something that promote cheerfulness is real 
piety. 

All cows are graminivorous. 

Some graminivorous animals are cows. 

In I to I. 

Some offences against the divine law are exempt 
from human cognizance. 

Some practices exempt from human cognizance 
are offences against the divine law. 

O can neither be converted simply nor acci¬ 
dentally ; for since only one term is distributed, a 
term would necessarily be distributed after con¬ 
version, which was not so before. There is, how¬ 
ever, a kind of conversion, called that of negation 
or contraposition, which consists in the transpo¬ 
sition of the extremes, and the combination of the 
particle “ not ” with both of them; as, “ Every duty 
is accompanied with a certain propriety ; whatever 
is not accompanied with a certain propriety is not 
a duty.” A may be converted in this manner; 
but it is most useful in the conversion of O. The 


OF LOGIC. 


41 


simple way of stating the proposition inO thus con¬ 
verted will be, to throw away the two “ nots ” that 
have been added to the proposition, and to unite 
the third, that it originally contained, with the pre¬ 
dicate. The proposition will thus be reduced to I, 
or a particular affirmative ; as, “ Some professors 
of religion are-not Christians,” is equivalent to, 
“ Some professors of religion are NOT-Christians 
of which the simple converse is, “ Some not- 
Christians are professors of religion;” that is, 
“ Some persons who are not Christians,” &c. 
This mode of conversion, though in form un¬ 
couth and useless, is, in fact, very frequently 
employed in argument. 


42 


CHAPTER III. 

OF SYLLOGISMS. 


SECTION I. 

The third part of Logic treats of syllo¬ 
gism, which is a discourse expressed in pro¬ 
positions. 

Reasoning or discourse, having been defined 
to be the progress of the mind from one judgment 
to another, (an illustration, however, rather than 
a definition, of the word,) every decomplex word 
which expresses reasoning must consist of two 
parts ; namely, that by means of which any thing 
else is proved, and which is termed the antecedent 
or premises; and that which is proved, called the 
■ inference , conclusion , deduction , or collection. The 
two former words, however, are generally used. 

Ti e difference between inference and proof is 
this :—In the former, I have the premises, and 
draw, or infer, the conclusion from them; in the 
latter, I have the conclusion, and prove it by 
bringing forward certain premises. 

In order to form a syllogism, there must be a 
necessary connexion between the premises. If 
any one were to say, “ William the Fourth is king 
of England}’’ “I stood in Venice on the Bridge 



COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 


43 


of Sighs;” nothing could be inferred, because 
these two propositions do not in the least depend 
one upon the other. 

Consequence, logically considered, is the de¬ 
pendence of the consequent upon its antecedent, 
or the mode in which that dependence is shown. 
In the latter of these two senses it is here em¬ 
ployed. There are two kinds of consequence, the 
material and the formal. 

Material consequence denotes that the conse¬ 
quent is inferred from the antecedent merely from 
the general sense, meaning, or matter of the argu¬ 
ment ; as, “ Some pleasures are allowable ; there¬ 
fore they are innocent.” 

Formal consequence denotes that the consequent 
is inferred from the antecedent, from the form of 
the expression. It gives the actual process of the 
mind in forming, or arriving at, the conclusion; as, 
“ All innocent things are allowable ; Some plea¬ 
sures are innocent; Some pleasures are allowable.” 
Logic takes cognizance of the formal consequence 
only, because the formal depends solely on the 
disposition of the terms, and their arrangement; 
and therefore can never be wrong; while, on the 
other hand, the material consequence, which looks 
to the signification of the terms, may frequently 
be liable to mistake. 

Those who object to the formal consequence 
as tautological and unnecessary, and there: >re 
laugh at the syllogism, should remember, that 
their derision may be applied with equal force to 
Grammar. They might just as well assert, that 
Grammar teaches nothing but absurdity, because 


44 


COMPENDIUM 


it instructs us in filling up the ellipses, which all 
writers and speakers use. 

A syllogism is commonly defined, a sen¬ 
tence in which something being premised, 
something else necessarily follows from it. 

It might be added,— besides, and on account of, 
those things which are premised, or granted. The 
truth of these premises being once allowed, the 
conclusion will follow, however the terms be 
changed. Thus, suppose we say,— 

All men are animals, 

John is a man, 

John is an animal. 

We may change the term men into any symbol,— 
say, A ; and animals into B ; and John into C yet 
the syllogism still holds good, and may be thus 
stated, 

All A is B, 

All C is A, 

All C is B. 

The inference must inevitably take place. 

There are several kinds of syllogism ; but the 
simple categorical will be here treated of. 

A categorical syllogism consists of three 
categorical propositions; the two former of 
which are termed, the antecedent; the 
third, the consequent; which before it is 
proved is called a problem, or question, 
afterwards, a conclusion. 


OF LOGIC. 


45 


For instance : 

The problem or question is, “ Are our actions 
in our own power ? ” 

The antecedent or premises are, “ We are not 
praised and blamed for things not in our own 
power ; while we are praised and blamed for our 
actions.” 

Conclusion, (which is illative, and expressed 
by some corresponding particle, such as, there¬ 
fore, &c.,) “ Our actions are in our own power.” 

Now, we syllogize, in order to prove, whether 
the two terms, or extremes of the problem or 
question, agree or do not agree with each other, 
or whether one is or is not the result of the other. 
This, however, can only be done by the following 
mode :— 

We must make use of some third term, 
in order to find whether the subject and 
predicate of a question agree ; and that, 
because of the following rules, on which the 
whole force of syllogism is founded :— 

Terms are said to agree with each other, when 
one may be said of the other affirmatively; as, 
“ Human nature is worthy of respect.” Here the 
terms. Human nature, and, A thing worthy of 
respect, agree. So, on the other hand, the terms 
of the following proposition disagree :—“God has 
not any pleasure in the death of the wicked;” 
that is, there is a mutual disagreement between 
the Deity and any being who could be imagined 
delighting in the punishment of his creatures, 
however they might deserve it. 


46 


COMPENDIUM 


1. Those terms which agree with one and 
the same third agree with one another. 

As, “All men, however elevated their state of 
grace, are liable to become ‘ castaways.’” 

“I am a man ; therefore,” &c. Here man is the 
middle term ; and because the extremes agree 
with it, they agree with each other. 

2. Those terms, one of which agrees, the 
other disagrees, with one and the same 
third, differ from one another. 

As, “ No man is naturally righteous ; 

I am a man ; 

Therefore, I am not naturally righteous.” 

3. Those which do not agree with one 
and the same third do not agree with one 
another. 

As, the terms man, and plants. There is no 
third term which will agree with both those ; 
therefore you cannot prove their agreement; 
that is, you cannot say, “ Men are plants.” 

This canon, however, properly belongs to the 
first. 

A fourth canon is adduced by most Logicians, 
namely,—Those terms, of which there is not any 
idea comprised in the one, which is not also com¬ 
prised in the other, do not differ from each other. 
This canon may be termed an appendage to the 
second. 


op LOGIC. 


47 


SECTION II. 

Prom these general principles the parti¬ 
cular rules of syllogism are thus reduced :— 

1. In every syllogism there are three, 
and only three, terms ; two in the conclu¬ 
sion ; and these can neither be proved to 
agree nor to differ, without one, and only 
one, third term. 

The conclusion to be proved, or the question, 
necessarily contains two terms ; and the process 
of proof requires their comparison, with one addi¬ 
tional term, and no more. Thus the following 
sentence, where there are more than three terms, 
is not a syllogism :— 

Themistocles governed the world. 

His wife governed Themistocles, 

Her child governed his wife. 

Therefore, her child governed the w'orld. 

So the ancient law of an eastern nation, (the 
Circassians, I think,) on the exaction of blood 
for blood, was a kind of false syllogism with more 
than three terms. This people argued:—“This 
man has killed my brother; this man’s father has 
begotten him ; now, had not he begotten a son, 
my brother would not have been killed ; there¬ 
fore, execute the father.” 

On the other hand, however, we must not con¬ 
demn an argument, when the terms are reducible 
to three, though, apparently, they may be more. 


48 


COMPENDIUM 


But each of the three terms should, for the 
sake of convenience and perspicuity, have a dis¬ 
tinguishing and appropriate name. Hence, 

The predicate of the question is styled 
the major term ; the subject, the minor ; 
the third term, the medium or middle term. 
For the predicate is commonly more com¬ 
prehensive than the medium, as the medium 
is than the minor. 

Therefore, the third term was called middle, 
as being mediate between the two others. 

2. In every syllogism there are three, and 
only three propositions ; two premises, in 
which the medium is compared with the two 
other terms severally ; the major proposition, 
in which it is compared with the major 
term ; the minor proposition, in which it is 
compared with the minor term ; and the 
conclusion, in which both those terms stand 
together. * 

The major premiss is sometimes called the 
projjosition, and the minor the assumption. As, 

* The middle term must not enter the conclusion ; for 
then we should he proving idem per idem. The follow¬ 
ing is an instance of an apparent syllogism of this kind:— 

Some really honourable men are Christians : 

All persons that deserve our esteem are Christians: 

Therefore, Christians are really honourable men. 


OF LOGIC. 


49 


Major premiss I 
or V 

Proposition. 


All men are mortal. 


Minor premiss 1 
or yi 

Assumption. 


r 


am a man. 


Conclusion. I am mortal. 

Here the major term is mortal. 

minor J 

middle man. 


In the most perfect form of syllogistic reason¬ 
ing, the major premiss is usually a general prin¬ 
ciple, which every one will allow ; the minor is, 
on the other hand, an assumption, that is, it is 
assumed, with a particular reference to a certain 
conclusion. Almost all controversy arises from 
a difference of opinion about minor premises ; 
men will generally grant to an opponent his gene¬ 
ral principle ; but they will not allow that this is 
a case in point; that is, they do not concede the 
minor. 


3. An equivocal medium proves nothing. 
For this is not one and the same third. 

The following is an instance :—■ 

A furious bull is a dangerous animal: 

Luther was attacked by a furious bull (from 
Rome) : 

Luther was attacked by a dangerous animal. 

4. An undistributed medium is equivocal. 

For instance : If the middle term be not taken 

F 


50 


COMPENDIUM 


in its widest sense in one or other of the premises, 
then the terms of the conclusion will be compared 
with it, when employed only partially. Conse¬ 
quently, nothing can be proved ; as. 

White is a colour. 

Black is a colour. 

Black is white ; 

where “ a colour” is not distributed. 

Therefore, 5. The medium must be dis¬ 
tributed in one of the premises. 

6. The process from a term not distributed 
in the premiss to the same distributed in the 
conclusion, is irregular. 

That is, in other words, an universal assertion 
concerning a term cannot be admitted in the con¬ 
clusion, from a premiss where that term has been 
only partially understood. The following syllo¬ 
gism, therefore, is erroneous :— 

All countries surrounded by the sea are in¬ 
sular : 

Some barren lands are countries surrounded by 
the sea : 

All barren lands are insular. 

Here there is an illicit process of the minor: For 
it should be observed, that the error in these 
apparent syllogisms is called an illicit process ; by 
which is meant, the employing a term universally 
in the conclusion which was only partially em¬ 
ployed in the premiss. 

7. Negative premises prove nothing; for 


OF LOGIC. 


51 


in this case a third is brought, from which 
both the terms differ. 

As, 

No wicked man shall enter the kingdom of 
heaven: 

No one that leads a holy life is wicked :— 

From these premises we cannot infer any con¬ 
clusion. Whether the extremes agree or disagree, 
is totally uncertain. 

8. If either of the premises is negative, so 
is also the conclusion. 

By the last rule it was determined, that if one 
premiss be negative, the other must necessarily 
be affirmative ; that is, if one extreme disagrees 
with the middle, the other must agree with it; 
but if one extreme agree, and the other disagree, 
with the middle, then, by a former canon, they 
disagree with each other. This disagreement 
constitutes a negative conclusion ; as. 

Nothing opposed to the will of God is politi¬ 
cally expedient : 

The worship of images is opposed to the 
divine will : 

Therefore, the worship of images is not politi¬ 
cally expedient. 

9. And if the conclusion be negative, so 
is also one of the premises. 

If the conclusion be negative, then the extremes 
must disagree ; then one must have differed from 

f 2 


52 


COMPENDIUM 


the middle ; which would require a negative pre¬ 
miss ; as. 

No true philosopher indulges anger or caprice : 
Socrates was a true philosopher : 

Therefore, Socrates did not indulge anger or 
caprice. 

10. Particular premises prove nothing. 

For there will be in every syllogism with two 

particular premises, an illicit process of the 
major ; as. 

Some logicians are not men of strong minds ; 
Some Englishmen are men of strong minds ; 
Some Englishmen are not logicians. 

11. If either of the premises be particular, 
so is also the conclusion. 

If the conclusion be universal, there is an illicit 
process of the minor term ; as. 

Upright men are worthy of respect. 

Some men of mean attainments are upright. 
Therefore, all men of mean attainments are 
worthy of respect. 

12. A particular conclusion may be drawn 
from an universal premiss ; for what may be pre¬ 
dicated of an universal may be predicated also of 
all the particulars contained under it. 

These rules may be considerably reduced ; and 
from them we may derive the following plain 
and inartificial order for the examination of a 
syllogism: 1. Count the propositions and terms. 

2. See that the middle is once distributed. 

3. Observe whether there are any illicit processes. 
And, 4. Look to the rules about negatives. 


OF LOGIC. 


53 


But arguments generally are not expressed in a 
syllogistic form : When, therefore, you meet with 
one which appears formally illogical, as well as 
materially so, reject all the needless verbiage with 
which weak and unsound writers frequently 
bolster up their sophistry, and reduce the argu. 
ment to a simple syllogism. Whether the writer 
has formed good premises, must be left to the 
investigation of individuals, in connexion with 
the sciences proper to the particular subject 
discussed ; and Logic will teach you how far his 
conclusion is valid. 


SECTION III. 

It remains to inquire, how many ways 
three categorical propositions can be joined 
together, so as to compose a regular syllo¬ 
gism. In which inquiry, two things are to 
be considered :— 

1. The mood, or the variation of the pro¬ 
positions according to their quantity and 
quality. 

A mood is rather the determination of a propo¬ 
sition according to its quantity and quality; e. g.. 
No man is infallible. 

The pope is a man. 

The pope is not infallible. 

This syllogism is in the mood E A E, 

F 3 



54 


COMPENDIUM 


2. The figure, or the manner of compar¬ 
ing the medium with the terms of the con¬ 
clusion. 


There are sixty-four moods: For the 
major of a syllogism may be either A, E, I, 
or O. To each of these a fourfold minor may 
be annexed, whence arise sixteen pairs of pre¬ 
mises ; and to each of these sixteen, a four¬ 
fold conclusion may be subjoined, thus :— 


AAA. AAE. AAI. AAO : 
AIA. AIE. AIL AIO : 
EAA. EAE. EAI EAO : 
EIA. E1E. Eli. EIO : 
IAA. IAE. IAI. IAO : 
IIA. HE. III. IIO: 
OAA. OAE. OAI. OAO : 
OIA. OIE. OIL OIO: 


AEA. AEE. AEI. AEO : 
AOA. AOE. AOI. AOO : 
EEA. EEE. EEL EEO : 
EOA. EOE. EOI. EOO : 
IEA. IEE. IEI. IEO : 
IOA. IOE. IOI. 100: 
OEA.OEE. OEI. OEO: 
OOA. OOE. 001. 000. 


But sixteen of these are excluded by the 
seventh rule, because their premises are 
negative; namely, EEA, EEE, EET, 
EEO: EOA, EOE, EOI, EOO: OEA, 
OEE, OEI, OEO: OOA, OOE, 001, 
000 : Twelve, by the tenth rule, because 
their premises are particular ; namely, IIA, 
IIE, III, IIO : IOA, IOE, IOI, 100 : 
OIA, OIE, Oil, OIO : Twelve, by the 
eighth rule, because one of the premises is 
negative, and not the conclusion : AEA, 
AEI, AOA, AOI : EAA, EAI: EIA, 



OF LOGIC. 


OO 

Eli: LEA, IEI : OAA, OAI : Eight, by 
the eleventh rule, because one of the pre¬ 
mises is particular, and not the conclusion : 
AIA : AIE : AOE : EIE : IAA : IAE : 
IEE : OAE : Lastly : Four, by the ninth 
rule, because the conclusion is negative, but 
neither of the premises : AAE : AAO : 
AIO : IAO. 

Therefore, fifty-two moods are excluded, 
many of which offend against several rules. 
There remain twelve, which only are useful 
in syllogism : AAA, AAI : AEE, AEO : 
All: AOO : EAE, EAO : EIO : IAI : 
IEO : OAO. 


SECTION IV. 

The: figures of syllogism are four: For 
the medium is either subjected to the major, 
and predicated of the minor, term, which is 
the first figure ; or predicated of both, which 
is the second ; or subjected to both, which 
is the third ; or predicated of the major, and 
subjected to the minor, which is the fourth ; 
as appears in the following scheme, wherein 
A is the major term, B the medium, C the 
minor:— 



56 


COMPENDIUM 


Fig. 1. 

B. A. 

C. B. 
C. A. 


Fig. 2. 

A. B. 
C. B. 
C. A. 


Fig. 3. 

B. A. 

B. C. 

C. A. 


Fig. 4. 

A. B. 

B. C. 

C. A. 


It must be remembered, that the major premiss 
should be placed first in the syllogism, and the 
minor second ; for if this order be not observed, 
the formal rules will not hold good ; thus, 

Man is an animal, 

All animals are mortal, 

Man is mortal. 

The premises of this syllogism, to render it 
logically correct, must be transposed. 

Wherefore, of the twelve remaining 
moods, each figure excludes six ; namely, 

1. Because of the undistributed medium, 
the first two, IAI : OAO ; the second, four, 
AAA : AAI: All : IAI ; the fourth, two, 
All : AOO. 

2. Because of the irregular process of the 
major term, the first figure excludes four 
moods, AEE, AEO, AOO, IEO; the 
second, two, IEO, OAO ; the third, four, 
AEE, AEO, AOO, IEO; the fourth, two, 
IEO, OAO. 

3. Because of the irregular process of the 
minor term, the third, two, AAA, EAE ; 
the fourth, two, AAA, EAE. 


OF LOGIC. 57 

There remain twenty-four conclusive moods, 
six in each figure :— 

O 


The First Figure. 

b A r Every wicked man is miserable : 
b A Every tyrant is a wicked man : - 
Therefore, 

r A Every tyrant is miserable. 

c E No discontented man is a happy man: 
1 A Every wicked man is discontented : 
Therefore, 

rEnt No wicked man is a happy man. 

d A All the faithful are dear to God: 
r I Some that are afflicted are faithful: 
Therefore, 

I Some that are afflicted are dear to God. 

f E No virtue is an evil: 
r I Some difficult things are virtues: 
Therefore, 

O Some difficult things are not evils. 

A Every wicked man is miserable : 

A All tyrants are wicked men : 
Therefore, 

I Some tyrants are miserable. 

E No discontented man is a happy man: 
A Every wicked man is discontented : 
Therefore, 

0 Some wicked men are not happy men. 


58 


COMPENDIUM 


The Second Figure. 

c E s No happy man is discontented : 

A Every wicked man is discontented : 
Therefore, 

r E No wicked man is a happy man. 

c A m Every wicked man is discontented : 

E s No happy man is discontented : 
Therefore, 

tr E s No happy man is a wicked man. 

f E s No evil is a virtue : 
t I Some difficult things are virtues : 
Therefore, 

n O Some difficult things are not evils. 

b A r Every good man is afflicted : 

O k Some rich men are not afflicted : 
Therefore, 

O Some rich men are not good men. 

E No happy man is discontented : 

A Every wicked man is discontented : 
Therefore, 

O Some wicked men are not happy men. 

A Every wicked man is discontented : 

E No happy men are discontented : 

Therefore, 

O Some happy men are not wicked men. 


OF LOGIC. 


59 


The Third Figure. 

d A r All the faithful are dear to God: 

A p All the faithful are afflicted : 

Therefore, 

11 Some that are afflicted are dear to God. 

d I s Some faithful are afflicted : 

A m All the faithful are dear to God : 
Therefore, 

I s Some that are dear to God are afflicted. 

d A t All the faithful are dear to God : 

I s Some of the faithful are afflicted : 
Therefore, 

I Some that are afflicted are dear to God. 

f E 1 No virtue is an evil: 

A p All virtues are difficult: 

Therefore, 

t O n Some difficult things are not evils. 

b O k Some Christians are not true believers : 
A r All Christians profess faith : 

Therefore, 

d O Some who profess faith are not true 
believers. 

f E r No virtue is an evil: 

I s Some virtues are difficult: 

Therefore, 

O n Some difficult things are not evils. 


CO COMPENDIUM 

The Fourth Figure. 

br A m Every tyrant is a wicked man : 

A n Every wicked man is miserable : 
Therefore, 

tip Some that are miserable are tyrants. 

c A m Every wicked man is discontented : 

E n No discontented man is a happy man : 
Therefore, 

E s No happy man is a wicked man. 

dim Some afflicted are faithful : 

A r All the faithful are dear to God : 
Therefore, 

I s Some that are beloved of God are afflicted. 

f E s No evil is a virtue : 

A p All virtues are difficult : 

Therefore, 

O Some difficult things are not evils. 

fr E s No evil is a virtue : 

I s Some virtues are difficult: 

Therefore, 

O n Some difficult things are not evils. 

A Every wicked man is discontented : 

E No discontented man is a happy man : 
Therefore, 

O Some happy men are not wicked men. 


The five moods, in which a particular is 
inferred where an universal might, have no par- 


OF LOGIC. 


61 


ticular name, and are not considered to be of any 
practical use. * 


* The following Latin verses may serve as a memoria 
tcchnicct , and assist the mind in remembering the various 
forms of correct argument, and the rules of reduction that 
follow:— 

BArbwAy CulArEnt, Dxru , FErioque, prioris; 

Cesave , CAmEstrEs, Fes (mo, BAroko, secundcE: 

Tertia , DatajjU, DxsAmis , JDaIisi, FElApton, 
BokArdo , FErison, habct: Quarto, insuper addit 
BrAiiiAntxp , Caviehes „ Dim avis, Ff.sApo, Ftesisoh : 
Quinquc Subaltcrni, totidem generalibus orti , 

Nomen habcnt nullum , nec, si bene colligis , usum. 

The word Fahoro is sometimes used instead of Baroko, 
in the second figure ; and Dokamo , instead of Bokardo , 
in the third. 

The proper quantity and quality for each proposition in 
each mood is as follows. 

First Figure must have 

Universal Major,—Else the middle not distributed. 
Affirmative Minor,—Else illicit process of the major, 
from which you may infer 
Any Conclusion. 

Second Figure must have 

Universal Major,—Else illicit process of the major. 

Any Minor, (but one premiss must be negative,) 
Negative conclusion,—Because of a negative premiss. 

Third Figure must have 
Any Major, 

Affirmative Minor,—Else illicit process of major. 
Particular Conclusion,—Else illicit process of minor. 

Fourth Figure must not have 
O for a Major,—Else illicit process of major. 

O for a Minor,—Else middle undistributed. 

A for a Conclusion,—Else illicit process of minor. 

This may be remembered by the memoria technica 
“ Un-aff-an ;—Un-an-neg;—An-aff-part;—not O, not O, 
not A.” 


G 


02 


COMPENDIUM 


SECTION V. 

The four first of these moods need 
nothing to make the force of the inference 
evident, but what is expressed in the pre¬ 
mises ; whereas all the rest do. These, 
therefore, are styled perfect, those imperfect, 
moods. 

The first figure is the most conclusive and 
satisfactory; because the celebrated axiom of 
Aristotle, called by the schoolmen “ the dictum 
de omni et nullo,” which is the test of all sound 
argument, may be directly applied to it. The 
dictum is thus explained by Aldrich :—“ Quod 
prcedicatur universaliter de alio, (id est, de ter- 
mino distribute ,) sive affirmative, sive negative, 
prcedicatur similiter de omnibus sub eo contentis j ” 
namely,—“That which is predicated universally 
of something else, (that is, of a term distributed,) 
whether affirmatively, or negatively, may be 
similarly predicated of every thing contained 
under it.” 

It will be a useful lesson for the logical 
inquirer to trace th e, principles of the four figures. 

An imperfect mood is said to be reduced, 
when it is changed into a perfect one ; in 
order to show evidently, either that the con¬ 
clusion is so, which is termed ostensive 
reduction ; or, that it cannot be otherwise, 
which is called reduction ad impossible. 


OF LOGIC. 


(33 


Now, when we change a syllogism in one figure 
to an equivalent syllogism in another figure, 
which is reduction, we may not introduce any 
new term or proposition; but we must content 
ourselves with the two premises which are granted 
to us. But these premises may be illatively con¬ 
verted, in order to demonstrate the absolute 
necessity of the inference more clearly. We say, 
illatively converted, or transposed, because the 
truth of any proposition necessarily implies that 
of its illative converse. The inference is most 
clearly stated in the first figure; therefore we 
reduce the other figures to the first. 

Ostensive reduction is the direct mode of 
proof; that is, we deduce from the premises 
originally given either the same conclusion or 
one equivalent to it,—one which may be made 
the same by illative conversion ; as, 

All thieves deserve condign punishment: 

All thieves are wicked men : 

Therefore, some wdcked men deserve condign 
punishment. 

This is a syllogism in Darapti. This is con¬ 
verted into Darii, by accidental conversion, or 
conversion by limitation, as it is sometimes 
called ; as. 

All thieves deserve condign punishment: 

Some wicked men are thieves : 

Therefore, some wicked men deserve condign 
punishment. 

Take another instance in Camestres :— 

All real religion is a religion of the heart: 


COMPENDIUM 


64 

The religion of a hypocrite is not a religion of 
the heart : 

Therefore, the religion of a hypocrite is not 
real religion. 

If you simply convert the minor premiss, and 
then transpose them both, the syllogism will be 
reduced to Celarent :— 

No religion of the heart is the religion of a 
hypocrite: 

All real religion is a religion of the heart: 

Therefore, the religion of the heart is not the 
religion of a hypocrite. 

Or, by illative conversion, “ The religion of the 
hypocrite is not a religion of the heart.” 

Reductio ad impossibile is that by which we 
prove, (in the first figure,) not directly that the 
original conclusion is true, but that it cannot be 
false ; that is, we admit the falsity of a conclu¬ 
sion, and then show, by tracing such a concession 
to its inevitable consequences, how absurd and im¬ 
possible it is. Let us take an example in Baroko :— 

b A The contented are wealthy : 

rOk Some men are not wealthy : 

O Some men are not contented. 

In the place of the minor, to which is 
attached the symbol k, which will be presently 
explained, substitute the contradictory of the 
conclusion ; the new premises will then be in 
Barbara :— 

The contented are wealthy, 

All men are contented. 

All men are wealthy. 


OF LOGIC. 


65 

But the original premises are granted to be 
true, therefore their contradictory is false; the 
new conclusion is a contradictory of the original 
minor, therefore it is false. But it was correctly 
inferred in Barbara j therefore, one of the pre¬ 
mises is false : This cannot be the major; for 
that, by hypothesis, was true ; therefore, it must 
be the minor : But this new minor is the contra¬ 
dictory of the original conclusion, therefore, if it 
be false, it is contradictory, that is, the original 
conclusion is true. Q. E. D. 

Some have supposed, that because this mode of 
reduction is usually applied to Bokardo and 
Baroko only, therefore it is not equally applica¬ 
ble to the other moods. This, however, is 
not the case; any mood may be reduced by re¬ 
duction ad impossibile, as well as by ostensive 
reduction. 

The method of reducing is taught by the 
names of the moods, in which the vowels are 
the propositions marked with their quantity 
and quality: The initial consonants, b, c, d, 
f, show to Avhat mood in the first figure the 
reduction is to be made ; s, p, show that the 
proposition which the preceding vowel stands 
for, is to be converted either simply or per 
accidens ; m, that the premises are to be 
transposed; [m— mutatio , or change;] k, 
that the reduction is to be ad impossibile ; 
that is, that for the premiss to whose sign it 


66 


COMPENDIUM 


adheres, the contradictory of the conclusion 
is to be placed, which being done, you will 
have, in the first figure, a conclusion, either 
the same with that premiss, or one converti¬ 
ble into it, or its contradictory. Thus :— 

1. c E s No happy man is discontented : 

A r Every wicked man is discontented : 
Therefore, 

E No wicked man is a happy man. 
Reduce this to 

c E No discontented man is a happy man : 

] A Every wicked man is discontented : 
Therefore, 

r E nt No wicked man is a happy man. 

2. d I s Some good men are Papists : 

A m Every good man is saved : 

Therefore, 

1 1 Some that are saved are Papists. 
Reduce this to 

d V Every good man is saved ; 
r I Some Papists are good men : 

Therefore, 

I Some Papists are saved. 

3. b A r Every good man is afflicted : 

Ok Some rich men are not afiheted : 
Therefore, 

O Some rich men are not good men. 


OF LOGIC. 


07 


Reduce this to 

b A r Every good man is afflicted . 
b A r Every rich man is a good man— 

A 

The manifest falsehood of which proves 
as manifestly the truth of its contradictory. 


SECTION VI. 

From what has been said, it is evident, 
that there can be no more moods than these 
twenty-four. They are therefore mistaken, 
who, having transposed the premises, or con¬ 
verted the conclusion, of a syllogism, imagine 
that they have found out a new mood or 
figure : To convince them of which, you 
need only refer to the definition of a mood, 
a figure, of a major, a minor, a middU term, 
and of a major and minor proposition. 

Observe, an universal affirmative conclusion 
can be deduced only from two universal affirma¬ 
tive premises, that is, Barbara in the first figure. 

Universal negatives may be proved by the first 
figure in Celarent; by the second in Cesare and 
Camestres ; in the fourth by Camenes. 

Particular affirmatives may be proved by the 
first figure in Darii, and Barbara; by the third, 
in Darapti, Disamis, and Datisi; by the fourth 
in Bramantip and Dimaris. 



68 


COMPENDIUM 


Particular negatives may be proved by the first 
figure in Ferio ; by the second in Festino, Baroko : 
by the third, in Felapion, Bokardo , and Ferison ; 
by the fourth, in Fesapo and Fresison; and by 
the subalternates of universal negatives; thus 
Camcstres will prove Camestros. 

But there are some sorts of arguments 
which, though not strictly regular, yet need 
not be wholly rejected. Such are, 

1. An Enthymemc, one premiss of which 
is wanting; whether the major or minor, the 
conclusion shows ; as, “ He is a good man : 
Therefore, he is happy. 11 

Enthymemes are abridged forms of argument, 
commonly used to avoid the redundance which a 
strictly syllogistic course of argumentation would 
involve. In these, the major premiss is most fre¬ 
quently suppressed, because it generally consists 
of an universal principle which every one will 
grant; as in the following instance, from Hooker : 
“ The Father by the Son did create and doth 
guide all; wherefore Christ hath supreme domi¬ 
nion over the whole universal world.” Here the 
major premiss is suppressed. 

Sometimes, however, the minor is suppressed, 
when it is obvious and apparent; or when parti¬ 
cular prominence is to be given to the major; as, 
“ Whatever induces a habit of a close and regular 
reasoning ought to be studied by every theolo¬ 
gian ; Logic, therefore, should be so studied.” 


OF LOGIC. 


09 


Flie first figure admits of entliymeme more 
readily than any other. 

Sometimes the whole argument lies in one 
sentence; as, “ Being mortal, do not bear 
immortal hatred/’ 

This is called an enthymematic sentence. 

2. An induction, in which what is granted 
of several particulars is then affirmed univer¬ 
sally ; as, “ This, and this, and that loadstone 
attracts iron: Therefore, every loadstone 
does/’ It is therefore a sort of enthymemc; 
a syllogism in Barbara , whose minor is 
understood. 

In forming our notion of induction, we must 
he careful to distinguish between that which 
merely signifies the process of investigation and 
of collecting facts, and the deducing an inference 
from those facts. It is in the latter sense that it 
is used in the present instance. It would be im¬ 
possible in an elementary treatise like the present, 
to enter into a defence of the syllogism, as includ¬ 
ing induction; a fact frequently denied. We 
must content ourselves with generally stating, 
according to Archbishop Whately, “ that in the 
process of reasoning by which we deduce, by our 
observation of certain known cases, an inference 
with respect to unknown ones, we are employing 
a syllogism in Barbara with the major * premiss 

* Not tlie minor, as is stated by Aldricli and in the text; 
the instance he gives will sufficiently prove this: u Tins, 


70 


COMPENDIUM 


suppressed;” that being always substantially the 
same, as it asserts, that “ what belongs to the in¬ 
dividual or individuals we have examined, belongs 
to the whole class under which they come.” 
For example, from an examination of the history 
of several tyrannies, and finding that each of them 
was of short duration, we conclude, that “ the 
same is likely to be the case with all tyrannies;” 
the suppressed major premiss being easily sup¬ 
plied by the hearer; namely, “that what belongs 
to the tyrannies in question is likely to belong to 
all.” “ Induction, therefore,” Whately proceeds, 
“ so far forth as it is an argument , may of course be 
stated syllogistically; but so far forth as it is a 
•process of inquiry with a view to obtain the pre¬ 
mises of that argument, it is, of course, out of the 
province of Logic.” “ The latter,” it is added, 
“ is the original and strict sense of the word.” 

3. An example, wherein what is granted 
of a known instance is presumed of an un¬ 
known that resembles it; as, “ Sylla and 
Marius tore the commonwealth : Therefore, 
so will Caesar and PompeyA Here also the 
minor * is understood : Therefore, the con¬ 
clusion is only presumed, not proved. 

and that, and the other magnet attract iron ; therefore, so 
do all.” If this were, as he asserts, an enthymemc whose 
minor is suppressed, the only premiss which we could sup¬ 
ply to fill it up, would he, ‘“'All magnets are this, that, and 
the other;” which is manifestly false. On this subject 
Dr. Whately lias several valuable observations. 

* it should be the major. 


OF LOGIC. 


7* 


Example differs from induction in two respects ; 
with regard to the premises , for while induction 
requires several singular instances to be enume¬ 
rated, example requires only one ; and with regard 
to the conclusion, which is universal in induction, 
either strictly or morally; but only singular and 
probable, with certain limitations, in example. 
Example is called by Aristotle oratorical induction ; 
and it is frequently a source of error and fallacy. 
The probability of its truth is of course increased 
by the accumulation of singular facts, because 
then it approaches to induction. 

4. A sorites, in whose antecedent every 
preceding term is subjected to the following, 
till you come from the subject of the con¬ 
clusion to the predicate of it; as, “ Every 
man is an animal ; every animal is a living 
creature; every living creature is a sub¬ 
stance : Therefore, every man is a substance.'’ 1 
In a sorites, as many syllogisms are under¬ 
stood, as there are intermediate propositions. 

The term “ sorites '* is derived from the Greek 
word crwpos, a heap. It will admit of only one nega¬ 
tive premiss, which must be the last, and of only 
one particular premiss, which must be the first.* 

* To these may be added the pro syllogism ; which is a 
proposition, introduced to confirm the truth of some premiss, 
and is therefore appended to it; as, “All religion (if, indeed\ 
it be real and sincere) will render a man happy.” 


CHAPTER IV. 


OF HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 


SECTION I. 

That is a liypotlietical syllogism, in which 
one or more of the propositions are hypo¬ 
thetical. The most common (of which alone 
we now speak) is that whose major proposi¬ 
tion is hypothetical. 

A hypothetical proposition is either con¬ 
ditional ; as, “ If he is wise, he is happy ; ” 
or disjunctive; as, Either it is day or 
night.” 

In a conditional proposition, the condi¬ 
tion itself is called the antecedent; the 
assertion, the consequent; the connexion 
between them, the consequence. 

The rules of conditional propositions are 
three :— 

1. If the antecedent be granted, so is the 
consequent. 

2. If the consequent be taken away, so is 
the antecedent. 



COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 


73 


3. Nothing can be inferred either from 
the taking away the antecedent, or granting 
the consequent. 

There are therefore only two terms of 
conditional syllogism:— 

The constructive ; as, 

If CD, then KA: But CD : There¬ 
fore KA. 

And the destructive ; as, 

If CD, then KA : But not KA : There¬ 
fore not CD. 


SECTION II. 

Every conditional syllogism is either 
equivalent to a categorical, or wholly to be 
rejected. For in every conclusive condi¬ 
tional, there is a categorical implied, in 
which the same argument would prove the 
same conclusion. 

For in all hypothetical syllogisms, the 
major proposition consisting of two catego- 
ricals, the minor is either one of these, or 
the contradictory to it, in order to infer 
either the other, or its contradictory. In 
either case, an enthymeme will be proposed, 

n 



74 


COMPENDIUM 


whose force lies in the conditional proposi¬ 
tion, and which is not conclusive, unless 
from that proposition there can be drawn a 
completory, that is, the premiss which is 
wanting in an enthymeme, to complete the 
syllogism. 

Now, as an enthymeme is only one pre¬ 
miss with the conclusion of a syllogism, it 
has three, and only three, terms. Suppose 
two of them are D and A, and C the third 
term. The other premiss, whose terms are 
D and A, is wanting. Hence it follows, 
that according to the various disposition of 
the terms, there are four forms of enthy¬ 
meme ; each of which will admit of a two¬ 
fold completory, as in this scheme :— 


OP LOGIC. 75 


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76 


COMPENDIUM 


Wherefore, as there are twenty-four pos¬ 
sible moods of categorical syllogism, and 
fourteen unexceptionable ones ; and as each 
figure may be applied twice, to complete an 
enthymeme; there will be forty-eight pos¬ 
sible ways of completing it, twenty-eight un¬ 
exceptionable. And as many ways as an 
enthymeme may be completed, so many, and 
no more, a man may argue with a syllogism, 
whose major is conditional. 


SECTION III. 

The directions given for conditional pro¬ 
positions, serve equally for disjunctive. For 
any disjunctive is easily turned into a con¬ 
ditional. For instance, if it runs thus :— 

It is either day or night. 

But it is day: Therefore it is not night. 
But it is night: Therefore it is not day. 
It is not day: Therefore it is night. 

It is not night : Therefore it is day. 

Instead of this, it is easy to say, 

If it is day, then it is not niglit. 

If it is night, then it is not day. 



OF LOGIC. 


i i 


If it is not day, tlien it is night. 
If it is not night, then it is day. 


SECTION IV. 

There remains only a kind of redundant 
hypothetical syllogism, called a dilemma, 
which proposes two, or more, things to your 
choice, by accepting either of which you 
lose the cause. Such is that of Bias : “If 
you marry a beautiful woman, she will be 
xoivy) ; if an ugly one, ttoivyj. Therefore, 
marry none.” 

A dilemma is of no force, unless, 1. One 
or the other part must be accepted. 2. 
Either one or the other prove the point. 
And, o. It cannot be retorted. If Bias 
had observed these things, he would have 
been less pleased with his own ; for it 
fails in every particular. For, 1. A wife 
may neither be beautiful nor ugly. There¬ 
fore, neither part of the dilemma need be 
accepted. 2. Neither is every beautiful 
woman common, nor every ugly one, a 
plague. Therefore, neither part of it proves 
the point, o. It may be retorted thus : 
“If I marry the one, at least she will not 

ii 3 



78 


COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 


be common ; if the other, she will not be 
a plague.” 

A dilemma is only a kind of negative 
induction, in which the major proposition is 
conditional; as, “ If at all, then thus, or 
thus, or thus.*’ To turn this into a cate¬ 
gorical syllogism, is so easy, it needs no 
direction. 


A 


COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 
BOOK II. 


CHAPTER I. 

OF SYLLOGISM, AS TO ITS MATTER. 


SECTION I. 

Hitherto we have spoken of syllogism, 
as to its form. It remains to speak of it 
as to its matter; that is, the certainty and 
evidence of the propositions, whereof it is 
composed. 

That is a certain proposition, against 
which nothing occurs, or nothing of weight, 
as, “ Man is risible :That an evident one, 
which extorts the assent, as soon as it is 
understood, as, “ The whole is greater than 





80 


COMPENDIUM 


its part:"” That a doubtful one, in which 
we know not how to determine, as, “ The 
stars influence men. 

If any thing occurs, whereby the mind 
inclines to either side, that which was doubt¬ 
ful before becomes probable. Such an 
assent is termed opinion. 

Opinion, therefore, respects a barely pro¬ 
bable proposition, and implies no certainty 
at all. Yet there are several degrees, 
whereby it approaches towards certainty; 
and the highest degree of probability is not 
far distant from it. 


SECTION II. 

Certainty is twofold : 1. That of the 
object, the thing to be perceived ; and, 2. 
That of the subject, the understanding 
which perceives it. And both have their 
degrees. That is more certain, in the 
former sense, to which there is the least 
objection; that, in the latter sense, to 
which the least objection appears. Evi¬ 
dence, also, is either of the object, or of the 
subject. And both of these have their 



OF LOGIC. 


81 


degrees; according as that which is per¬ 
ceived is more or less self-evident; or ap¬ 
pears to be one or the other. 

We might enumerate many degrees of 
evidence. But it may suffice to observe, it 
is either, 1. That, of a self-evident axiom : 
Or, 2. That of a conclusion regularly de¬ 
duced therefrom. This, logicians term 
science ; which accordingly they define, “ on 
assent to a certain and evident conclusion, 
regularly deduced from certain and evident 
premises.” The certainty and evidence here 
supposed, is that, both of the object, and of 
the subject. For, by the former, science 
is distinguished from error ; by the latter, 
from opinion. Without the evidence of the 
subject, there can be no science; and this 
without the other, is but an imaginary evi¬ 
dence. 


SECTION III, 

Wf. need not prove, that there is such a 
thing as certainty; seeing all reasonable 
men allow it. We freely assent to what is 
affirmed by a wise and good man ; and more 



82 


COMPENDIUM 


freely, if lie confirms it by reason. Some 
tilings we are taught by nature itself; and 
some by Divine revelation. And of all these 
we have sufficient certainty, although in va¬ 
rious degrees. 

To assent to testimony, is the same as 
to believe ; and such an assent is termed 
faith. Divine faith depends on the testi¬ 
mony of God: Human faith, on the testi¬ 
mony of man. What nature dictates, we 
may be said to perceive; what reason 
teaches us, to know. 

God can neither deceive, nor be de¬ 
ceived ; men are often deceived, and often 
deceive. Reason and nature are not often 
deceived, and seldom deceive their followers. 
Nothing, therefore, is more firm than divine 
faith; nothing less so, than human. In 
what we perceive or know, there is often no 
fear, always some danger, of being deceived. 
Hence, there is the highest rest for the mind 
in divine faith ; the lowest of all in human. 
In what we know or perceive, there are 
various degrees of rest, according to the 
various evidence, certainty, or probability. 

If, therefore, we were to make a sort 
of scale of assent, it might consist of the 
following steps :—1. Human faith, an as- 


OP LOGIC. 


83 


sent to a doubtful proposition : 2. Opinion, 
to a probable: 3. What we may term 

sentiment, an assent to a certain proposi¬ 
tion : 4. Science, to a certain and evi¬ 
dent conclusion: 5 . Intelligence, to a 

self-evident axiom : 0. Divine faith, to a 

Divine revelation. 


SECTION IV. 

To each of these there belong certain 
principles, which are peculiarly proper to 
produce it. The principles of divine faith 
are those, and those only, which are contained 
in the Scriptures: Of intelligence, those 
which are properly termed axioms: Of 
science, the conclusions regularly deduced 
from them. 

An axiom is a proposition which needs 
not, and cannot, be proved. Such the fol¬ 
lowing seem to be :— 

From natural Divinity :—1. God cannot 
deceive, or be deceived. Whence flow 
these certain and evident conclusions: 2. 

Absolute faith is due to the testimony of 
God: 3. Revelation never contradicts 

either sense or reason. It may, indeed, 



84 


COMPENDIUM 


transcend both. But it cannot possibly 
contradict either, rightly employed about 
its proper object. 

From mathematics :—The whole is greater 
than each of its parts; equal to them all. 
But mathematicians frequently lay down, as 
such, what are not axioms, properly speak¬ 
ing- 

From metaphysics :—It is impossible for 
the same thing at the same time to be, 
and not to be. Some affirm this to be 
the only axiom in the world ; a point not 
worth the disputing. 

From logic :—Terms which agree in one 
and the same third, agree with one another. 


SECTION V. 

Many believe, that there are no axioms 
to be found in the other arts and sciences. 
But such principles at least are found there¬ 
in, as ^ produce sentiment, if not science. 
Such are these:—Nothing (naturally) 
springs from nothing. Nothing is the 
cause of itself. What you would not have 
another do to you, you ought not to do 
to another. 



OP LOGIC. 


85 


The principles that serve to produce 
opinion, are usually styled “ maxims.’ 1 They 
commonly hold, but not always. To this 
class those properly belong which are, as 
it were, in the middle way, between doubt¬ 
ful and certain. 

The uncertainty of human faith arises 
hence: In order to produce a firm assent of this 
kind, a competent witness must know what 
he says, and say what he knows, and both 
be apparent to him that believes it. But 
this is rarely the case. Wherefore, we have 
always reason to suspect what we have no 
other proof of than human testimony, 
even when there appears no more reason 
to doubt thereof, than of a mathematical 
demonstration. 


SECTION VI. 

According to these five degrees of as¬ 
sent, syllogism might have been divided, 
with regard to its matter, into infallible, 
scientifical, certain, probable, and doubtful. 
But as the two first of these produce science, 
and any assent short of this is, loosely 

i 



86 


COMPENDIUM 


speaking, termed 44 opinion ;” it is usually 
divided only into two sorts : 1. That which 

produces science ; and this is styled scienti- 
fical, otherwise demonstrative, and often 
demonstration: 2. That which produces 

opinion, (any assent short of science,) and 
is termed dialectical; that is, arguing pro¬ 
bably. 

There are two species of demonstration. 
The first demonstrates, that a thing is ; 
proving, either directly, that it is so ; (and 
this is called 44 direct demonstration;”) or that 
if it be not, some absurdity will necessarily 
follow. This is usually called, demonstratio 
ab absurdo. We may properly term it 
44 oblique.” 

We demonstrate directly, either, 1. By 
proving a thing from its effect; as, 44 The 
sun is black : Therefore it is eclipsed.” 
Or, 2. By proving it from its remote cause; 
as, 44 The moon is diametrically opposite 
to the sun : Therefore it is eclipsed.” But 
if we prove this from the earth's being inter¬ 
posed between them, this is 

The second sort of demonstration, which 
demonstrates why a thing is, by assigning 
its proximate and immediate cause. 

But there may be a proximate, which 


OF LOGIC. 


87 


is not tlie prime cause, that is self-evident 
and indemonstrable, whose evidence is there¬ 
fore preferred before all other, as needing 
no light but from itself. 

There are then four degrees of demon¬ 
stration : The oblique demonstration is 
good; but the direct is preferable to it. 
Demonstration by the proximate cause is 
better still; but the prime cause, best of 
all. 


88 


CHAPTER II. 

OF FALLACIES. 

There is yet another species, or shadow 
rather, of syllogism, which is called a fallacy. 
It is, an argument intended to deceive. 
Such is, % 

1. The fallacy of equivocation, arising 
either from an equivocal word, or from the 
ambiguous structure of the sentence ; as, 
6 All that believe shall be saved. The 
devils believe. Therefore the devils shall 
be saved/ 1 This offends against the very 
first rule of syllogism. For it has four 
terms. 

2. The fallacy of composition, where 
what is granted of several things separately, 
is inferred of them conjointly; as, “Two 
and three are even and odd. Five is two 
and three. Therefore five is even and 
odd. 11 

3. The fallacy of division, when what is 
granted of things taken conjointly is in¬ 
ferred of them taken separately ; as, “The 
planets arc seven. The sun and moon are 


COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 


&) 

planets. Therefore the sun and moon are 
seven.' 11 In both these syllogisms there are 
four terms. 

4. The fallacy of the accident, when 
some accidental circumstance is confounded 
with what is essential; as, “ What de¬ 
stroys men, ought to be prohibited. Wine 
destroys men. Therefore wine ought to be 
prohibited. 11 The major proposition must 
mean, “ What necessarily destroys men : 11 
Otherwise it is not true. The minor, “ Wine 
accidentally destroys men. 11 Therefore, here, 
also, there are four terms. 

5. The fallacy of arguing from a partial 
lar to a general ; as, u He that is white 
as to his teeth, is white. A blackamoor is 
white as to his teeth. Therefore a blacka¬ 
moor is white. 11 Here is a palpable breach 
of the sixth rule of syllogism. 

G. The fallacy ignorationis elenchi. An 
elenchus is a syllogism that confutes the 
opponent. Therefore he falls into this fal¬ 
lacy, who thinks he confutes his opponent 
without observing the rules of contradic¬ 
tion. 

7. The fallacy of begging the question, 
that is, taking for granted the very thing 

which ought to be proved. This is done, 

i 3 


90 


COMPENDIUM OP LOGIC. 


1. When we attempt to prove a thing by 
itself; or, 2. By a synonymous word ; or, 
3. By something equally unknown ; or, 4. 
By something more unknown ; or, 5. By ar¬ 
guing in a circle, as in the famous argument 
of the Papists, who prove the Scriptures 
from the authority of the Church, and the 
Church from the authority of the Scrip¬ 
tures. 

8. The fallacy of several questions ; as, 
“ Are honey and gall sweet ? ” It is solved, 
by answering to each branch distinctly. 

Many more fallacies than these might be 
reckoned up. For there are as many falla¬ 
cies, as there are ways of breaking any of 
the rules of syllogism without being ob¬ 
served. But one who is thoroughly ac- 
quainted with those rules, will easily detect 
them all. 


91 


CHAPTER IIP 

OF METHOD. 


; SECTION I. 

Method is such a disposition of the 
parts of any art or science, that the whole 
may be more easily learned. 

It is two-fold, 1. Method of invention, 
which finds out the rules of an art or 
science; 2. Method of teaching, which 

delivers them. The former proceeds from 
sensible and particular things, intelligible 
and universal; the latter from intelligible 
and universal things, to sensible and par¬ 
ticular. 

Method of teaching is either perfect or 
imperfect. The former is either, 1. Uni¬ 
versal, by which a wlioh *t or science, or, 
2. Particular, by which a part of it only, 
is taught. Both are either, 1. Synthetical, 
which' is used in sciences, and, beginning 
with the subject of a science, treats of its 



92 


COMPENDIUM 


principles and affections, and then of its 
several species, till, from the highest genus, 
it descends to the lowest species : Or, 2. 
Analytical, which is of use in arts ; and, 
beginning with the end or design of an art, 
next explains the subject of it, and, lastly, 
the means conducive to that end. 

The general rules of method are these :— 

In delivering an art or science, 1. Let 
nothing be wanting or redundant : 2. Let 

all the parts be consistent with each other : 
3. Let nothing be treated of, which is not 
homogeneous to the end of the art, or the 
subject of the science: 4. Let the parts 

be connected by easy transitions: 5. Let 

that precede, without which the things that 
follow cannot be understood; but which 
itself can be understood without them. 

The particular rules are these : 1. The 

unity of a science depends on the unity of 
its subject; the unity of an art, on the 
unity of its end: 2. Let the more general 

parts precede the less general. 

The imperfect method is arbitrary and 
popular ; being no other than the method 
of prudence or common sense. 


OP LOGIC. 


93 


SECTION II. 

Mathematicians, in all tlieir writings, 
follow this method : 1. They fix the mean¬ 
ing of their words, defining their terms, 
each in their place, and make it an invari¬ 
able rule, never afterwards to use any term, 
but in the sense to which it is limited by 
that definition: 2. They lay down the 

axioms which there will be occasion to use 
in the course of their work : 3. They add 

their postulate !, which also they demand to 
be granted, as being evident of themselves : 
4. They then demonstrate their propositions, 
in order, and as far as may be, affirmatively; 
contenting themselves with this rule, That 
whatsoever they have to prove, they take 
care to prove it from some of the truths 
which have been granted or proved before. 

If the same method cannot be strictly 
observed in other sciences, yet doubtless it 
may be imitated. And the nearer any 
method approaches to this, the more perfect 
and useful it is. 


APPENDIX. 


ON THE MANNER OF USING 
LOGIC. 

EXTRACTED FROM BISHOP SANDERSON. 


SECTION I. 

OF TREATING ON A SIMPLE THEME. 

We may use the rules of Logic, in treat¬ 
ing either on a simple theme, or a problem 
of proposition. 

In treating logically on a simple term, 
we are to explain both the name and the 
thing. And, 

I. The name, by, 1. Pointing out the 
ambiguity of the term, (if there be any,) 
recounting its various meanings, and fixing 
on that particular meaning in which we at 
present take it: 2. Showing its various 

appellations both in our own and in other 
tongues: 3. Observing whence it is de- 



COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 


95 


rived, with the more remarkable words of 
the same derivation. Not that all this is 
necessary to be done at all times, and on 
every theme : But there is need of judg¬ 
ment and choice, that those particulars only 
may be noted which conduce to the explica¬ 
tion of the thing. 

II. The thing is explained, both by as¬ 
signing Its attributes, and distributing or 
dividing it into its parts. The attributes 
are cither essential or non-essential. By 
essential we understand, not only those 
which properly constitute its essence, the 
genus and difference, but also the properties 
of substances, the subjects and objects of 
accidents, with the efficient and final causes 
of both. 

The genus should be assigned in the first 
place, and that the nearest wdiich can be 
found, though premising, if occasion be, 
those wdiich are more remote. The differ¬ 
ence comes next; the want of which is sup¬ 
plied, and the nature more fully explained, 
by properties. And here may be added, 
the efficient, principal, impulsive, and in¬ 
strumental causes, with the remote or proxi¬ 
mate ends. Here also, in treating on an 
accident, may be subjoined its proper sub- 


COMPENDIUM 


96 

ject and adequate object : But these, more 
or less, as need shall require; which are 
to be closed with a complete essential defi¬ 
nition of the thing. 

III. The theme is next to be distributed 
into its several species or parts, just to name 
which is generally sufficient. From distri¬ 
bution we proceed to the non-essential attri¬ 
butes, wdiether effects, cognates, or oppo¬ 
sites. 

IV. Such effects as are trivial, or com¬ 
monly known, may either be just mentioned 
or passed over in silence. Those which are 
more noble, and less commonly known, may 
by ranged under proper heads. This is also 
the place for citing examples. 

Cognate words are those which are com¬ 
pared with the theme, as agreeing with it: 
Opposite, as differing from it. A theme is 
explained by comparing it with its cognates, 
when things are mentioned, which are, in 
some respects, the same, or like it; and it 
is shown wherein that sameness or likeness 
lies, and also wherein the unlikeness or dif¬ 
ference between them. 

We, in the last place, compare the theme 
with its opposites ; for even opposites cast 
light upon each other. There are four spe- 


OF LOGIC. 


97 


cics of these; hut the contradictory is 
usually too vague and indefinite to be of 
any service : And the relative opposite has 
been mentioned before, among the essential 
attributes. Therefore, the privative and con¬ 
trary opposites only have place here, and 
very properly close the treatise. 

To give an instance of this. Suppose the 
simple theme to be treated of be Envy. 

I. I am to consider the name: And 
here I observe, 

1. It may mean either actively or passively : 
As, “ He is full of envy : ” that is, he en¬ 
vies others. <c A ricli man is much exposed 
to envy ; ” that is, to be envied by others. 
We here take it in the former sense. 

2. This is in Latin termed invidia , a word 
which has been borrowed by many modern 
languages. The Romans also termed it 
livor . 

3. The word invidia is supposed to be 
derived from two Latin words, that imply 
the looking much upon another, which the 
envious are apt to do; the word livor from 
the livid complexion which usually attends 
an envious temper. 

There are two words of the same deriva¬ 
tion, which are frequently confounded with 

K 


98 


COMPENDIUM 


eacli other ; namely, “ invidious ” and “ envi¬ 
ous and yet the signification of the one 
is widely different from that of the other. 
An envious man is one who is under the 
power of envy : An invidious office, one 
that is apt to raise envy or dislike. 

II. In explaining the thing, I observe, 
first, the essential attributes : As, 

The genus : To premise the more remote ; 
it is a passion, a sort of grief: But the 
nearest genus is, a vicious grief. 

I next observe, the difference, taken 

1. From the subject, which are almost 
all mankind; but chiefly those who are 
ignorant of God, and consequently unable 
to govern themselves. 

2. From the object, which is twofold ; 
of the thing, or of the person. The thing 
envied may be good of any kind ; apparent 
or real, useful or pleasant; of mind, body, 
or fortune. The person envied may be any 
other man, superior, equal, or inferior; 
only not at an immense distance, either of 
time, of place, or of condition. For few 
envy them that have been long dead, them 
that live in China or Japan; or those who 
are above or beneath them beyond all de¬ 
grees of comparison. 


OP LOGIC. 


99 


3. From the efficient cause. The princi¬ 
pal internal cause in him that envies is 
pride and inordinate self-love. The impul¬ 
sive external cause may be various, either 
in him that is envied, if he be an enemy, a 
rival, a vain boaster ; or in some third per¬ 
son, as contempt, flattery, whispering; any 
of which may stir up envy. 

We may therefore define envy, either 
more briefly, a vicious grief at the good of 
another ; or more fully, an evil sadness of 
mind, whereby a man, from inordinate self- 
love, is troubled at the good which he sees 
another enjoy, or foresees he will enjoy, 
as he imagines it will lessen or obscure his 
own excellency. 

III. There are three species of envy, 
each worse than the preceding : the first, 
when a man is pained at another's enjoying 
some good (in kind or degree) which he 
cannot himself attain : The second, when a 
man is pained at another's having what he 
himself has, but wnnts to have alone : Both 
these are exemplified in Caesar, who would 
bear no superior; and in Pompey, who 
would bear no equal. The third is, when a 
man cannot or will not enjoy his own good, 
lest another should enjoy it with him. It is 

ii 2 


100 


COMPENDIUM 


well known how many in the learned world, 
are infected with this evil disease. 

IV. The effects of envy are three : 1. It 
torments the mind continually, and spreads 
inquietude through the whole life. 2. It 
wastes even the bodily strength, and drinks 
up the spirits : A most just evil, which is 
at once a sin and a punishment, and not less 
a scourge than it is a vice. 3. It incites a 
man to all manner of wickedness ; detrac¬ 
tion, calumny, strife, murder. 

Its most remarkable cognates are, 1. 
Hatred, which agrees with envy in its sub¬ 
ject ; for he who envies another cannot but 
bate him ; and in its efficient, internal cause, 
which in both is pride and blind self-love. 
2. Rejoicing in evil: This also agrees with 
envy both in its subject, (for he that grieves 
at another’s happiness, cannot but rejoice in 
his misery,) and in its efficient cause. 

And yet hatred differs from envy, 1. In 
the thing hated or envied. For good only 
is envied ; but either good or evil may 
be hated. 2. In the person. For we envy 
men only, not God ; and not ourselves, but 
others : But we may hate both other men 
and ourselves ; both other creatures, and God 
himself. 


OF LOGIC. 


101 


Rejoicing in evil differs likewise from 
envy, 1. In the genus : For the genus of the 
latter is sorrow ; of the former, joy. 2. In 
the object, which, in the one, is evil, in the 
other, good. 

The grand opposite to envy is benevo¬ 
lence, a tender good-will to all men, which 
constrains us to wish well to all, and seri¬ 
ously to rejoice in all the good that befalls 
them. 


SECTION II. 

OF TREATING ON A PROBLEM. 

A problem is, a proposition to be 
proved. It is sometimes fully proposed, 
whether positively, as, 44 Logic is an art, 1 " 
which is called a “ thesis; 11 or, interroga¬ 
tively, as, 44 Is Logic an art P 11 Sometimes 
imperfectly, when the subject only is men¬ 
tioned, the predicate being left in question, 
as, 44 Of the genus of Logic. 11 

In a regular treatise on a problem there 
are three parts ; the stating the question, 
proving the truth, and answering objections. 
To which may be premised, the introduc- 

ic 3 



102 


COMPENDIUM 


tion, concerning the importance of the ques¬ 
tion, and the occasion of its being first dis¬ 
puted ; and the conclusion, containing a 
recapitulation of the whole, with the corol¬ 
laries arising therefrom. 

I. In the introduction may be shown, that 
the point in debate is not of little or no 
moment, but either apparently of the highest 
concern, or if not so important in itself, 
yet absolutely necessary to be understood, 
in order to understand or explain those 
which are confessedly of the highest mo¬ 
ment. Next should be pointed out the 
occasion of the doubt, and the origin of 
the error; what gave the first rise to this 
dispute ; and how the mistake began and 
increased. But this must be done nakedly 
and simply, in a logical, not rhetorical, man¬ 
ner. 

II. After a short preface, the problem is 
not immediately to be proved, (unless where 
the terms are quite clear, and the point little 
controverted,) but first the terms of the 
question are to be explained, both the sub¬ 
ject and the predicate. The various senses of 
these should be observed, and the definitions 
given, particularly of the predicate. We 
then proceed to explain the true state of 


OF LOGIC. 


103 


the controversy, by showing what is granted 
on each side, and what disputed. For in 
every controversy, there is something where¬ 
in both parties agree, and something wherein 
they differ. In reciting the points wherein 
we and our opponents agree, we may add, if 
need be, a short explanation or proof of 
them ; and then show wherein the proper 
difference, the very point of controversy, 
lies. If this be accurately shown, the busi¬ 
ness is in a manner done ; for it is scarce 
credible, how much light this throws both on 
the proof of the truth, and the answering 
objections. 

III. In proving the truth, if it be a plain, 
simple problem, it may suffice briefly to 
propose our judgment in a single affirmative 
or negative thesis, and to confirm it by a few 
well-chosen arguments. But if it be more 
complex, it will be expedient to comprise 
our defence of it in several propositions; 
beginning with those wherein we remove 
the opinions of others, and then going on 
to establish our own ; after every proposi¬ 
tion placing the arguments by which it is 
confirmed. But it does not suffice, barely 
to mention these; they are also to be 
strongly pressed and defended, and the 


104 


COMPENDIUM 


evasions and cavils of all adversaries to 
be examined and overturned. 

IY. Next follows the answering of ob¬ 
jections. These may either be subjoined 
to the several opinions of our opponents, 
and so answered severally; or all placed 
together, after we have proved the point 
in question, and so answered altogether. 

In order to do this effectually, we should 
observe, first, “ Is not the conclusion ad¬ 
vanced against me wide of the mark ? ” 
Frequently the objection may be allowed, 
and it does not overturn any conclusion, 
which we have advanced. Nay, sometimes 
it may be retorted, as proving just the con¬ 
trary of what it was intended for. 

J 

If the conclusion do really contradict any 
of ours, we are, secondly, to examine the 
form of the argument, according to the 
general and particular rules of syllogism ; 
and to point out that rule against which 
it offends. 

If the form be unexceptionable, it re¬ 
mains, thirdly, to consider the matter of the 
objection from the premises. And it will 
generally be found, that either one of the 
premises is false, (or, at least, not suffi¬ 
ciently proved,) or that there is a latent 


OP LOGIC. 


105 


ambiguity in the subject, the predicate, or 
the medium. In this ease, we are to fix 
upon that term and show the ambiguity 
of it. 

V. We may close the whole by repeating 
the sum of what has been proved; unless 
when some useful observations or corollaries, 
either directly, or by easy consequence, 
follow from the conclusions before estab¬ 
lished. These we are not to prove again, 
but briefly and nakedly to set them down, 
as naturally deducible from those proposi¬ 
tions which have been proved before. 

The sermon on the Means of Grace, in 
the first volume of Mr. Wesley’s Sermons, 
is a treatise of this kind. 

The sermon on Enthusiasm, in the third 
volume, is another example of a simple 
theme. 


LOGICAL QUESTIONS, 


FOR SELF-EXAMINATION. 

PART I. 


BOOK I—CHAPTER I. 

OF SIMPLE TERMS. 


SECTION I. 

1. How many operations of the mind are there ? 

2. Name them. 

3 . What do you mean by Simple Apprehension ? 

4 . Of how many kinds is it ? 

5 . Is there any analogy between ocular percep¬ 
tion and mental Apprehension ? 

6. What is Simple, incomplex Apprehension ? 
What, complex Apprehension ? 

7. Apply the two kinds of Apprehension to the 
following words, and say which kind you use in 
understanding them. “ The King of England 

“ The animal called man ; ” “ Human nature ; ” 
“ Kings reign, and princes decree justice “ Great 
Britain is surrounded by water; ” “A hand ; ” 
“ A book ‘ f A hand touching a book.” 




COMPENDIUM OP LOGIC. 107 

8. Which kind of Apprehension is prior in the 
order of time ? 

9. What is Judgment ? 

10. How many kinds of Judgment are there ? 

11. Which is called composition ? 

12. Which, division? 

13. Give instances of both affirmative and 
negative Judgment. 

14. What is the difference between Judgment 
and Complex Simple Apprehension ? 

15. Are the following Judgments affirmative or 
negative ?— 

“ Not to advance in religion is to go back.” 

“ No unrighteous man shall enter heaven.” 

“ The word aSoKi/xos, which we render reprobate, 
might as well have been rendered disapproved .”— 
Whitby. 

“ In some things it is more hard to attempt than 
to achieve.”— Bacon. 

16. How is Judgment formed in the mind? 

17. What is Discourse ? 

18. Is it generally distinguished now by this 
name ? State some others. 

19. Give instances of Reasoning. 

20. What are the errors incidental to each 
operation of the mind ? 

21. In what ways are our notions indistinct ? 

22. By what means is our Judgment misled ? 

23. Is Logic, correctly considered, an art or a 
science ? 


108 


COMPENDIUM 


SECTION II. 


24. How do we express our thoughts ? 

25. What is the definition of Logic ? 

26. What end has Logic in view? 

27. What means does it adopt for the attain¬ 
ment of that end ? 

28. What is the definition of a word ? 

29 . Explain this definition. 

30. Why are not inarticulate sounds, words ? 

31. How does Logic instruct the mind to 
operate rightly? 

32. Into how many kinds are words divided, 
and why? 

33. What are those words called which merely 
express Simple Apprehension ? 

34. What, those which express Judgment ? 

35. What, those which express Reasoning ? 

36. How many complex words are there in a 
decomplex ? 

37. Into how many propositions may every 
argument be resolved ? 

38. Every proposition,—into how many words ? 

39. In number or in sense ? 

40. What is the subject, what the predicate, 
and what the copula ? 

41. Is the subject always the first word, and 
the predicate the last, in a proposition ? 

42. What is a term, and why so called ? 

4 3. Point out the propositions among the fol¬ 
lowing sentences, and state the subject, copula, 
and predicate of those which are such :— 


OF LOGIC. 


109 


“ By a multiplicity of words, the sentiment is 
not set off and accommodated, but, like David in 
Saul’s armour, it is encumbered and oppressed.” 
— Campbell's Rhetoric. 

“To reprobate is, as it were, a putting the fatal 
rope about a man’s neck, and tying his hands 
behind him : And whatever follows, whether ex¬ 
hortations or prayers, is but in order to a prepara¬ 
tion for turning the ladder.”— Cahinist’s Cabinet 
Unlocked. 

“ It is impossible to think without materials.” 
— Johnson. 

“ What an object is the universe to the crea¬ 
ture, if there be a creature who can comprehend 
its system ! ”— Butler. 

“ A principal device in the fabrication of the 
mock-eloquent style is to multiply epithets,—dry 
epithets, laid on the outside, and into which none 
of the vitality of the sentiment is found to circu- 
late.”— Foster. 

“ It is to be hoped that we shall succeed 

“ There’s nought but care on every hand.” 

“ Sweet it is to gaze upon- 

“ Seek, and ye shall find.” 

“ Said I, that my limbs were old ? ” 

“ I say, B-, will you ? ” 

“ This, I say.” 

“ Fare you well ” 

“ I said, ' My friends, where are they \ ’ ” 

L 




110 


COMPENDIUM 


“When, from a state of prosperity, we are 
reduced to low circumstances-” 

“ Est modus in rebus.” 

“ It must be so.” 

“As leaves fall in wintry weather.” 

“ If the heart of a man is oppressed with care.” 


SECTION III. 

44. Of what sort of words does the first part 
of Logic treat ? 

45. What words may be the subject and predi¬ 
cate of a proposition ? 

46. What words may not ? 

47. Give instances. 

48. Define the logical noun? 

49. What is the difference between a simple 
term, a logical noun, a subject, and a predi¬ 
cate ? 

50. Give names to the following words :— 
“Lastly.” “In vain.” “This man.” “He 
speaks, and listening to his voice.” “ Happy.” 

51. Are common nouns ever used as singular? 
Give instances. 

52. Under what head of nouns do you class 
their oblique cases ? 

53. What is an infinite word ? 

54. What is a finite ? 




OF LOGIC. 


Ill 


55. By what names are they commonly called ? 
Give instances. 

56. Define positive, privative, and negative 
words. 

57. Quote some instances of each kind. 

58. What are univocal, equivocal, and analog¬ 
ous words ? 

59. Are “ bull,*’ “ foot,” “ ounce,” “ club,” 
“ mail,” “ page,” “ear,” “nail,” each equivocal? 
Which are analogous ? 

60. Is the word college, used to signify both a 
building and the society inhabiting it, equivocal 
or analogous ? 

61. Adduce some more instances. 

62. What is an absolute word ? What, a conno- 
tative ? 

63. What is the difference between generaliza¬ 
tion and abstraction ? 

64. What are relative nouns ? 

65. How are we able to form an idea of them ? 

66. What is a correlative ? 

67. What are consistent words ? 

68. How many kinds of opposition are there ? 
Name them. 

69. How are black and white, seeing and blind, 
opposed ? 

70 . Which is the greatest of all opposi¬ 
tion ? 

71 . Define nouns of the first and second in¬ 
tention. 

72 . Is the word Perfection, as applied to a 
doctrine of the Wesleyan Methodists, employed 
in the former or latter sense ? 

2 


112 


COMPENDIUM 


73. Which of these divisions of nouns are most 
useful ? Why ? 

74. Give instances of the use of the division 
of nouns into First and Second Intention ? 


SECTION IV. 

75. Define a predicable ? 

76. How many kinds of predicates are there ? 

77- What is a genus? What, a species ? What, 

a property ? 

78. Can a genus ever be considered as a 
species ? 

79. Trace the process of abstraction ? 

80. What is an accident ? Adduce instances. 

81 . How do you form the general notion Theo¬ 
logian ? Sailor ? 

82 . Does abstraction lead from singulars to 
universals, or the contrary ? 

83 . Is the abstract nature the same in all indi¬ 
viduals, or different in each ? 

84 . Why must a predicable be of the second 
intention ? 

85. Does the abstract nature really exist? 

86. Why then was it supposed to do so ? 

87. What is essence ? 

88. Prove that there can only be five kinds of 
predicables. 

89. What is difference ? What else may it be 
called ? 



OP LOGIC. 


113 


90. What is the exact difference between pro¬ 
perty and accident ? 

91. Give instances. 

92. Who first taught the doctrine of the cate¬ 
gories ? 

93. What else may they be called ? 

94. How many categories are there ? 

95. Name them. 

96. How many kinds of substance are there 
Name them. 

97- What is the Aristotelian name for sub¬ 
stance ? 

98. Give instances of continuous and discrete 
quantity. 

99. How many kinds of time are there ? 

100. What is the Aristotelian name for the 
category of time ? 

101. What is the category of KelaOcu} 

102. What do you mean by the summum 
genusf 

103. If I say of horses, that they are quadru¬ 
peds, what predicable is “ quadruped ? ” 

104. If I say of some quadrupeds that they are 
cats, what predicable is “ cats ? ” 

105. Is genus predicated of things differing in 
number or in species ? 

106. What do you mean by a metaphysical 
whole ? 

107. What are cognate genera ? Give in¬ 
stances. 

108. Form a Porphyrian tree. 

109. What is the use of this scale ? 

110. How many kinds of difference are there ? 

l 3 


114 


COMPENDIUM 


111. How many kinds of property* are there ? 

112. Is the division of property into four kinds 
a good division ? 

113. State your reasons for this assertion. 

114. How many kinds are valid ? 

115. How does summum genus differ from in - 
fima species ? 

116. How do those things of which specific 
difference is predicated differ from each other ? 

117. How many kinds of accident are there ? 

118. Prove your answer. 

119- Give instances of each kind. 

120. What kind of accident is a passed event ? 


SECTION V. 

121. How do you divide a common word ? 

122. Give instances,. 

123. Define Division. • < 

124. To what is logical division analogous ? 

125. How many kinds of division are there? 

126. What is physical division? 

127. Are singular nouns in any way divisible ? 

128. How would you physically divide book ? 

129. What is metaphysical division ? 

130. What are the three rules for logical divi¬ 
sion ? 

* In tlie Christian character, is the doing good works 
the difference or the property ? 



OF LOGIC. 


115 


131. What is the criterion of good logical divi¬ 
sion ? 

132. What do you mean by the members of the 
division being opposite ? 


SECTION VI. 

133. What is Definition ? 

134. Is the word definition here used in the first 
or the second intention ? 

135. What are the two objects of definition ? 

136. What is the first division of definition ? 

137- What is the difference between nominal 

and real definition ? 

138. Is every nominal definition necessarily 
etymological ? 

139. Do nominal and real definitions ever co¬ 
incide ? 

140. Quote exan. r -f this. 

141. How many Kinds of real definition are 
there ? 

142. What is an accidental definition? 

143. What is an essential definition ? 

144. Is essential definition 'again divided? 

145. What are the rules for good definition ? 

146. Analyse the following definitions, and as¬ 
sign their proper names :— 

“ Quick wits commonly be apt to take, unapt 
to keep ; also for manners and life, they com¬ 
monly be, in desire, new-fangled; in purpose, 



116 


COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 


unconstant; light to pi'omise any thing, ready to 
forget every thing, both benefit and injury; and 
thereby neither fast to friend, nor fearful to foe : 
Inquisitive of every trifle ; not secret in the great¬ 
est affairs ; bold with any person; busy in every 
matter ; soothing such as be present, nipping any 
that is absent: Of nature also, always flattering 
their betters, envying their equals, despising their 
inferiors ; and, by quickness of wit, very quick 
and ready to like none so well as themselves.”— 
Roger Ascham. 

“ Socinians are a sect so called from Faustus 
Socinus, who died in Poland, in 1604.” 

“ Embalming is the art of preserving dead bodies 
from putrefaction.” 

“ Knowledge is assent produced by self-evidence 
or demonstration.” 

“ Ink is a mixture of copperas, gall, and gum.” 


117 


CHAPTER II. 

OF PROPOSITIONS. 


SECTION I. 

147. Of what does the second part of Logic 
treat ? 

148. Has a proposition any other name ? 

149- What is the essence of a proposition? 

150. What, the property ? 

151. What mental operation does it signify? 

152. Why may it not he ambiguous ? 

153. In the use of what particles does most of 
the ambiguity of propositions arise ? 

154. Adduce instances. 

155. What is the logical definition of a proposi¬ 
tion ? 

156. Which is the genus and which the differ¬ 
ence in that definition ? 

157- Why may not a proposition be maimed ? 

158. Are the following sentences propositions 
or not ? If they are, point out their quantity, 
quality, &c. ; distinguish the subject, copula, and 
predicate ; state whether they are categorical and 
hypothetical, and reduce them to the categorical 
form. 



118 


COMPENDIUM 


“ And when he thought thereon, he wept.” 

“ The most eminent and successful Preachers 
of the Gospel, in different communities, a Brain- 
erd, a Baxter, and a Schwartz, have been the 
most conspicuous for a simple dependence upon 
spiritual aid .”—Robert Hall. 

“ The word of God alone can make wise unto 
salvation.” 

“ All that glitters is not gold.” 

‘‘There must be a spiritual resurrection of the 
soul before there can be a comfortable resurrec¬ 
tion of the body.”— Pearson. 

“ Baxter was not wholly a Calvinist.” 

“ How manifold are thy works ! ” 

“ In all controversies, when men dispute to¬ 
gether, the one affirming, the other denying, both 
parties must needs have the same idea in their 
minds of what they dispute about.”— Cudworth. 

“ He was either a hero or a villain.” 

“ With singular justice was that man con¬ 
demned to die.” 

“A man ’s a man for a’ that.”— Burns. 

“ Never come within the circle of ambition, 
nor ever bring yourself into comparison with those 
masters of the earth, who have already engrossed 
the attention of half mankind before you .”—Adam 
Smith. 

“ Now do not these exhortations plainly inti¬ 
mate, that Christians may receive the grace of 


OF LOGIC. 


119 


God in vain; that they may render the labours 
of the Ministers of the Gospel vain, by not hold¬ 
ing fast the word of life; that Satan may devour 
them, if they be not sober, vigilant, and steadfast 
in the faith ; and that their assurance of not fall¬ 
ing depends upon their diligence in the perform¬ 
ance of their duty?”— Whitby. 

“ It is not uncommon to hear a verbose speaker, 
or writer, mentioned as having * a very fine com¬ 
mand of language,’ when perhaps it might be 
said, with more correctness, that ‘ his language has 
a command of him.’ ”— Whately. 

“Avoid uncommon and, as they are vulgarly 
called, hard words.”— Ibid. 

“ Brahmins live on vegetables only.” 

“ How injurious is sin to the best interests of 
mankind ! ” 

“ Where is the dust that hath not been alive ?” 

“To them whom he acknowledges to be 4 tem¬ 
ples of the living God,’ by virtue of ‘ his Spirit 
dwelling in them,’ Saint Paul directs this exhor- 
tation, ‘ not to receive the grace of God in 
vain.’ ” — .Whitby. 

“ I hope to win the race.” 

“ How much of heaven is naturally connected 
with an office, whose sole purpose is to lead men 
thither.”— Robert Hail. 

“Words, therefore, as well as things, claim 
the care of an author.”— Johnson. 

“All dare to write, who can, or cannot read.” 

— Horace. 


120 


COMPENDIUM 


“ A right choice of words is the foundation of 
eloquence.”— Ccesar. 

“ He that reads and grows no wiser seldom 
suspects his own deficiency ; but complains of 
hard words and obscure sentences, and asks why 
books are written which cannot be understood.” 
— Johnson. 

“ ’T is the Divinity that stirs within us ; 

’T is Heaven itself that points out an hereafter. 

And intimates eternity to man.”— Addison. 

“There is one easy and almost sure way to 
avoid being misled by this self-partiality, and to 
get acquainted with our real character : To have 
regard to the suspicious part of it, and keep 
a steady eye over ourselves in that respect.”— 
Butler. 

“ To argue from a hypothesis against facts, is 
contrary to the rules of true philosophy.”— Reid. 

“The moment we permit ourselves to think 
lightly of the Christian ministry, our right arm 
is withered ; nothing but imbecility and relaxa¬ 
tion remains.”— Robert Hall. 

“ I thought it good and necessary, in the first 
place, to make a strong and sound head or bank 
to rule and guide the course of the waters ; by 
setting down this position or firmament, namely, 
‘ That all knowledge is to be limited by religion, 
and to be referred to use and action.’ ”— Bacon. 

159. What is the quantity of a proposition? 

160. Into how many kinds are hypothetical 
propositions divided ? 


OP LOGIC. 


121 


161. How are propositions divided according 
to tlieir quality ? 

162. How, according to their quantity ? 

163. How, according to their substance? 

164. What do you mean by the word “hypo¬ 
thetical ? ” 

165. What is a categorical proposition ? 

166. What is a modal ? 

167. Adduce instances of a conditional hypo¬ 
thetical. 

168. Of a disjunctive hypothetical. 

169. What is a negative proposition ? 

170. Is every proposition negative, in which 
the particle “ not ” is found ? 

171 • Adduce an example. 

172. What do you mean by an affirmative pro¬ 
position ? 

173. What is an indefinite proposition ? 

174. Why so called ? 

175. What signs are prefixed to propositions to 
denote their quantity ? 

176. What is meant by the distribution of a 
term ? 

177. Why is a singular proposition reckoned 
universal ? 

178. How are indefinite propositions employed 
in syllogism ? 

179. As far as regards syllogism, of how many 
kinds is the quantity of proposition ? 

180. How do you decide the quantity of inde¬ 
finites ? 


M 


122 


COMPENDIUM 


SECTION II. 

181. Of what is A the sign in Logic? E? 

I? O? 

182. What term is distributed in an universal 
affirmative ? 

183. What is an universal negative? Particu¬ 
lar negative ? 

184. Is the predicate of an universal affirma¬ 
tive ever distributed ? 

185. Adduce propositions in A, E, I, and O. 

186. What is the matter of a proposition ? 

187. What is necessary matter ? 

1S8. What, impossible ? Contingent? 

189- Adduce instances of each. 

190. In what matter is an indefinite proposition 
considered universal ? In what, particular ? 

191. Is I, in necessary matter, true or false? 
O? E? 


SECTION III. 

192. When are propositions said to be opposed ? 

193. How many kinds of opposition are there ? 

194. Define the several kinds of opposition. 

195. What are the requisites necessary for a 
contradiction ? 

196 . Which is the greatest possible opposition ? 
197- If an universal be true, what is the parti¬ 
cular contained under it ? 



OF LOGIC. 


123 


198. In what matter are contrary propositions 
both false ? 

199. Are subcontraries ever both false ? 

200. Give instances of subalternate opposition. 


SECTION IV. 

201. What do you mean by conversion, in 
Logic ? 

202. How many kinds of conversion are there ? 

203. What is simple conversion ? 

204. What is conversion per ciccidens, or acci¬ 
dental ? 

205. If the proposition be true or false, will the 
simple converse be true or false ? 

206. Why may not a term be distributed in the 
converse, which was not distributed in the origi¬ 
nal proposition ? 

20 7- What propositions are simply convertible ? 

208. What, accidentally ? 

209 . What is meant by conversion by limita¬ 
tion ? 

210. How is O converted ? 

211. What do you mean by conversion by nega¬ 
tion ? 

212. Give instances. 

213. Prove that I may be converted simply. 

214. Can A be converted simply? 

215. What is illative conversion ? 

m 2 



124 


COMPENDIUM OP LOGIC. 


216 . Convert the following propositions:— 

“There are Iscariot voices among the ten 
thousand ‘ Hail, Masters * which fill our ears.”— 

Mason (of New- York ). 

“ Infidel is now a term of reproach.”— Ibid. 

“ To halt between two opinions marks the fee¬ 
bleness of present indecision, and will only con¬ 
duct to future ruin.”— Ibid. 


“ No species of wrong is expedient.” 


125 


CHAPTER III. 

OF SYLLOGISMS. 

% 


SECTION I. 

217- Of what does the third part of Logic 
treat ? 

218. What is a syllogism? 

219. Of what operation of the mind is an ar¬ 
gument the sign ? 

220. What is that which is proved called ? 

221. What, that by which it is proved ? 

222. What is the conclusion called before it is 
proved ? 

223. What is consequence , logically considered ? 

224. How may kinds of consequence are 
there ? 

225. What is material consequence ? What, 
formal ? 

226. How may objections against the formal 
consequence be answered ? 

227. How is a syllogism commonly defined ? 

228. What may be properly added to this defi¬ 
nition ? 

229. What is the difference between an argu¬ 
ment and a syllogism ? 

m 3 



126 


COMPENDIUM 


230. Suppose you change the terms of a syllo¬ 
gism, but retain their order, will the syllogism 
stand good ? 

231. Has Logic any thing to do with the proof 
of the premises ? 

232. By what means do we compare two terms 
together ? 

233. When are terms said to agree with each 
other ? 

234. Do those terms which do not agree with 
one and the same third, agree with each other? 

235. What fourth canon is sometimes added by 
logicians to these ? 


SECTION II. 

236. How many terms must there be in every 
• syllogism ? 

237. Why can there not be more ? 

238. Is the following a syllogism ?—“ He who 
calls you a goose calls you an animal; he who 
calls you an animal speaks the truth; therefore he 
who calls you a goose speaks the truth.” 

239. How many terms are there in this argu¬ 
ment ? 

240; What are the three terms of a syllogism 
called for the sake of perspicuity ? 

241. How is the major term known ? How, the 
minor ? the middle ? 



OF LOGIC. 127 

242. Upon what premiss is it that men gene¬ 
rally differ ? 

243. What is an equivocal medium ? 

244. What, an undistributed medium ? 

245. What do you mean by an illicit process ? 

246. Give instances. 

247. Do negative premises prove any thing ? 
Why ? 

248. In looking for an ambiguity in the mid¬ 
dle term, are we to regard the sense or the 
sound ? 

249. “ Binding is ornamental; a man is bound 
when placed in the stocks; therefore the punish¬ 
ment of the stocks is ornamental.” Show the 
fallacies contained in this syllogism. 

250. What is the error of an undistributed 
middle term ? 

251. Adduce examples. 

252. How many terms, in point of fact, are 
there contained in the following argument r— 
“ Methodists are Christians ; Quakers are Chris¬ 
tians ; therefore, Quakers are Methodists.” 

253. Show that a syllogism, in which the mid¬ 
dle term is distributed only once, is valid. 

254. Why is the mode of inferring by an illicit 
process faulty ? 

255. If one premiss be negative, what will the 
conclusion be ? Why ? 

256. What error is involved in a syllogism 
which contains two particular premises ? 

257. Adduce examples. 

258. If one premiss be particular, what must 
be the quantity of the conclusion ? 


m 


COMPENDIUM 


259. If, in this case, the conclusion were made 
universal, what error would ensue ? 

260. If both the premises are universal, does 
it follow necessarily that the conclusion must also 
be universal ? 


SECTION III. 

261. What is a mood ? 

262. What is a figure ? 

263. How many moods are there ? 

264. Is every mood correct ? Why ? 

265. How many moods have two negative pre¬ 
mises ? 

266. How many have two particular premises ? 
267- How many have a negative premiss and a 

positive conclusion ? 

268. How many have an universal conclusion 
with a particular premiss ? 

26Q. How many have a negative conclusion 
without a negative premiss ? 

270. How many moods, then, are available in 
syllogism ? 

271. Which are they ? 

272. Can I E O ever be used in syllogism ? 

273. How many rules are infringed by the 
mood O O A ? 



OF LOGIC. 


129 


SECTION IV. 

274. How many figures are there? 

2/5. How is the middle term placed in each 
figure ? 

276. How many moods are excluded by each 
figure ? 

277. Give the schemes of all the figures, tak¬ 
ing A as the major term, B as the minor, C as the 
middle. 

278. Repeat the memoria technica. 

279. Assign the proper quantity and quality to 
each proposition, and give the reason for each. 


SECTION V. 

280. Explain the dictum deomni et nullo. 

281. When is an imperfect mood said to be re¬ 
duced ? 

282. What is ostensive reduction? 

283. What is reductio ad impossible ? 

284. What is meant by illative conversion ? 

285. Why do we reduce all figures to the first ? 

286. Give an example of some mood in the 
first figure, and show that Aristotle’s dictum will 
immediately apply to it. 

287- Can the moods in the first figure be ren¬ 
dered more manifestly conclusive than they are ? 



130 


COMPENDIUM 


288. Does the dictum of Aristotle immediately 
apply to all the moods in the other figures ? 

289. On what does this depend ? 

290. Define reduction. 

291. What is its use ? 

292. May all the moods be reduced osten- 
sively ? 

293. May all be reduced by reduction ad im- 
possibile ? 

294. Have the different letters, which compose 
the names of the moods, a reference to their re¬ 
duction ? 

295. To what do the three vowels in those 

names relate ? 

296 . What does the letter m signify? 

297. For what are the letters s and p used ? 

298. What does the letter k imply? 

299. Do these letters apply to their preceding 
vowels, or to those that follow them ? 


SECTION VI. 

300. How many useful moods are there ? 
Prove this. 

301. By how many moods may an universal 
affirmative conclusion be drawn ? 

302. What moods admit of an universal nega¬ 
tive ? 

303. How many, of a particular affirmative ? 

304. How many, of a particular negative ? 



OF LOGIC. 


131 


305. What conclusions may he drawn in the 
first figure ? 

306. What, in the second, and why ? 

30/. What, in the third and fourth, and why? 

308. Why cannot an universal affirmative con¬ 
clusion be drawn in the fourth figure ? 

309. What must be the quality of one premiss 
in the second figure, and why ? 

310. What must be the quantity of the major 
premiss in the first figure, and why ? 

311. Is it restricted as to quality ? 

312. What must the minor premiss be in the 
third figure, and why ? 

313. What may the major premiss be in this 
figure ? 

314. In this figure, is the conclusion restricted 
as to quantity ? Why ? 

315. What proposition is excluded from being 
a major premiss in the fourth figure, and why ? 

316. What proposition is excluded in this mi¬ 
nor premiss, and why ? 

317. If an universal affirmative conclusion be 
drawn, what must be the quantity and quality of 
the premises from which it is inferred ? 

318. If a particular negative premiss be used 
in any mood, what must be the quantity of the 
other premiss, and also of the conclusion ? 

319. Which is the worst figure of all? 

320. W ; hat is an enthymeme ? 

321. Is the enthymeme much used as a mode 
of expressing argument in common discourse ? 

322. Which premiss is usually suppressed in 
an enthymeme ? 


I32 


COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 


323. State the cause of this. 

324. What is induction ? ' 

325. What is example? 

326. Is induction strictly syllogistic reasoning ? 

327. What is the difference between example 
and induction ? 

328. What do you mean by a prosyllogism ? 
Adduce some examples. 

329. Why, in arguing, do we frequently sup¬ 
press the conclusion ? 

330. Explain the sorites. 

331. From what Greek word is it derived ? 

332. Is the sorites strictly syllogistic? 


133 


CHAPTER IV. 

OF HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 


SECTIONS I, II, HI, IV. 

333. What is a hypothetical syllogism ? 

334. Into how many kinds is it divided ? 

335. What are the rules of hypothetical syllo¬ 
gisms ? 

336. Is a conditional syllogism equivalent to a 
categorical ? Why ? 

337. What rules must be observed with regard 
to disjunctive syllogisms ? 

338. Can disjunctives ever be turned into con¬ 
ditionals ? 

339. Adduce some examples. 

3i0. What is a dilemma ? 

341. How may a dilemma be sometimes re¬ 
torted ? 

342. What is necessary to constitute a good 
dilemma ? 

343. What other logical name may be given 
to it ? 


N 



m 


PART II. 

CONTAINING TRUE AND FALSE SYLLOGISMS 
IN ALL THE FIGURES. 


1 . 

All men are animals ; 

I am a man ; 

I am an animal. 

2 . 

Kings are mortal ; 

Men are mortal; 

Kings are men. 

3. 

Dogs are not reasoning animals ; 
Reasoning animals are men ; 
Men are not dogs. 

4. 

Some birds cannot fly ; 

1 am not a bird ; 

I cannot fly. 



COMPENDIUM OP LOGIC. 


135 


5 . 

All the members form a society ; 
I am a member ; 

I form a society. 


6 . 

Not all is gold that glitters; 
Sovereigns glitter; 

Sovereigns are not gold. 

7 . 

The King of England is a sovereign ; 
I have a sovereign; 

I have the King of England. 

8 . 

All logicians are rational animals ; 

All logicians are men ; 

Some men are rational animals. 

9 . 

A musician keeps time ; 

A clock keeps time ; 

A clock is a musician. 

10 . 

Homer wrote in Gieek ; 
iEschylus was not Homer ; 

/Eschylus did not write in Greek. 

N 2 


13 6 


COMPENDIUM 


11 . 

All Greek writers are men ; 
Cicero was not a Greek writer ; 
Cicero was not a man. 

12 . 

All persons that think, exist; 

I exist j 
I think. 


13 . 

A letter goes by the post ; 

A newspaper goes by the post; 

A newspaper is a letter. 

14 . 

Nothing is better than a virtuous life ; 
Bread-and-cheese is better than nothing ; 
Bread-and-cheese is better than a virtuous life. 

15 . 

No real Christians are covetous ; 

A miser is covetous ; 

A miser is not a real Christian. 

16 . 

That which is pursued for its own sake only is 
the ultimate end ; 

Happiness, and only happiness, is pursued for 
its own sake only ; 

Happiness is the ultimate end. 


OP LOGIC. 


137 


17 . 

All innocent things are allowable ; 
Some pleasures are not innocent; 
Some pleasures are not allowable. 

18 . 

Some wise men have become mad ; 
He is not a wise man ; 

He will not become mad. 


19 . 

All monarchs are worthy of respect; 

All monarchs are not wise men ; 

Some persons not wise are worthy of respect. 

20 . 

Ivory is hard ; 

Ivory is elastic ; 

Some hard substances are elastic. 

21 . 

Some writers are ingenious ; 

Some writers are clever; 

Some clever writers are ingenious. 

22 . 

Virgil was seduced into faults by imitation ; 
Virgil was a great poet; 

Some persons that are deceived into faults by 
imitation are great poets. 

N 3 


138 


COMPENDIUM 


23 . 


All men are responsible ; 

All responsible agents will be rewarded or 
punished; 

All men will be rewarded or punished. 

24 . 

No soldier is a sailor ; 

A marine is a soldier ; 

A marine is not a sailor. 

25 . 

All Englishmen are lovers of liberty ; 

No Dane is an Englishman ; 

No Dane is a lover of liberty. 

26 . 

All important subjects deserve consideration ; 
Some trifles deserve consideration ; 

Some trifles are important subjects. 

27 . 

Every dog barks ; 

Some spaniels are dogs ; 

Some spaniels bark. 


28 . 

All men are fond of liberty : 

Some persons fond of liberty are Englishmen ; 
Some Englishmen are men. 


OP LOGIC. 


139 


29 . 

No liar is worthy of credit; 

Some persons worthy of credit are not believed ; 
Some liars are believed. 

30 . 

Some men are coxcombs ; 

All coxcombs are fools ; 

All fools are men. 

31 . 

None but whites are civilized ; 

All civilized people use clothing ; 

All whites use clothing. 

32 . 

Some men are logicians ; 

All sophists are men ; 

Some sophists are logicians. 


33 . 

Some of the basest of men do not discover to 
the world their true character ; 

All who do not discover to the world their true 
character are hypocrites; 

Some hypocrites are the basest of men. 

34 . 

Hector slew Patroclus ; 

Achilles slew Hector; 

Achilles slew Patroclus. 


140 


COMPENDIUM 


35 . 

All islands are surrounded by water; 

England is an island; 

England is surrounded by water. 

36 . 

No good logicians resort to sophistical argu¬ 
ments ; 

All who are acquainted with the science of 
reasoning accurately are good logicians ; 

None who resort to sophistical arguments are 
good logicians. 


37 - 

All spirits are inflammable ; 

A ghost is a spirit; 

A ghost is inflammable. 

38 . 

Some men are not sophists; 

Some men are good logicians ; 

Some good logicians are not sophists. 

39 . 

Every virtuous act is worthy of commendation ; 
Profane swearing is not a virtuous act. 
Profane swearing is not worthy of commen¬ 
dation. 


OF LOGIC. 


141 


40 . 

All felons are thieves ; 

All felons are amenable to the law; 

All who are amenable to the law are thieves. 

41 . 

All thieves are felons ; 

All felons are amenable to the law ; 

All who are amenable to the law are thieves. 

42 . 

Every true patriot is a friend to religion ; 

Some great statesmen are not friends to reli¬ 
gion ; 

Some great statesmen are not true patriots. 


43 . 


He-who-is-not-a-friend-to-religion is not a true 
patriot; 

Some great statesmen are not-friends-to-reli- 
gion ; 

Some great statesmen are not true patriots. 

44 . 

No Mahometans are Christians ; 

Some Mahometans are men of good under¬ 
standing ; 

Some men of good understanding are not 
Christians. 


142 


COMPENDIUM 


45 . 

Some musicians are mad ; 

All musicians are men ; 

Some men are mad. 

46 . 

Nothing which is difficult of attainment is 
within the reach of the idle; 

All useful knowledge is difficult of attainment; 
Useful knowledge is not within the reach of 
the idle. 


47 . 

Charity covereth a multitude of sins ; 
A multitude of sins is a load of evil; 
Charity covereth a load of evil. 

48 . 

Anger is a species of insanity; 

You are angry; 

You are insane. 


49 . 

All papists believe the pope to be infallible ; 
The pope is a man ; 

All papists believe a certain man to be infallible. 

50 . 

He that spareth the rod hateth his child ; 

An affectionate parent does not hate his child ; 
An affectionate parent does not spare the rod. 


OF LOGIC. 


143 


51 . 

No man can serve two masters ; 
A dog is not a man ; 

A dog can serve two masters. 


52 . 


He who disobeys his parents is an undutiful son ; 
An undutiful son is deserving of punishment; 
All those deserving of punishment disobey their 
parents. 

53 . 

A brute is not an immortal being; 

All immortal beings are incorporeal; 

No incorporeal beings are brutes. 


54 . 

All meteors are vapours ; 

Some vapours are luminous ; 

Some luminous bodies are meteors. 

55 . 

Those who work hard deserve reward; 

Those who work on the treadmill work hard; 
Those who work on the treadmill deserve re¬ 
ward. 

56 . 

All minerals are produced under ground; 

Some things produced under ground are 
potatoes ; 

Potatoes are minerals. 


COMPENDIUM 


144 


57 * 

John is younger than William ; 

William is younger than Thomas ; 

John is younger than Thomas. 

58 . 

All men are bound to act according to the 
strictest rules of virtue ; 

No brutes are men ; 

No brutes are bound to act according to the 
strictest rules of virtue. 

59 . 

No man that wastes his time will ever be 
successful in study ; 

All persons who waste their time have no one 
to blame but themselves ; 

All persons unsuccessful in study have no one 
to blame but themselves. 

60 . 

No logicians are sophists ; 

Some sophists are men ; 

Some men are not logicians. 

61 . 

Some learned men are much addicted to 
prejudice ; 

None who are much addicted to prejudice are 
men of powerful minds ; 

Some men of powerful minds are not learned. 


OF LOGIC. 


14* 


62 . 

All useful arts are worth learning ; 

Nothing that is worth learning is of no value ; 
That which is of no value is not a useful art. 


63 . 

Some good acts are not duly rewarded ; 

All good acts deserve to be rewarded ; 

Some acts which deserve to be rewarded are 
not duly rewarded. 

64 

Caloric is either a substance ora quality; 

It is not a substance ; therefore. 

It is a quality. 

65 . 

Nothing which is opposed to the divine will is 
expedient ; 

Every act of injustice is opposed to the divine 
%vill; 

No act of injustice is expedient. 

66 . 

Every thing that is immaterial is also immortal; 
The human soul is immaterial; 

Therefore, it is immortal. 

67 . 

No vicious man is happy ; 

The habitual drunkard is a vicious man ; 

The habitual drunkard is not happy, 

o 


146 


COMPENDIUM 


68 . 

Every thing that obstructs the free course of 
justice deserves the reprobation of the virtuous ; 

There are modes of enforcing the strict letter 
of the law which obstruct the free course of justice; 

Therefore, 

There are modes of enforcing the strict letter of 
the law -which deserve the reprobation of the 
viituous. * 


69 . 

No brute possesses virtue ; 

Some bad husbands are brutes ; 

Some bad husbands do not possess virtue. 

70 . 

Many men have common sense; 

Some men have uncommon sense; 

Some who have uncommon sense have also com¬ 
mon sense. 


71 . 

To kill a man is sin ; 

To hang a murderer is to kill a man ; 

To hang a murderer is sin. 

72 . 

Whatever is self-sufficient is possessed of the 
chief Good ; 

The confident man is self-sufficient; 

The confident man is possessed of the chief Good. 


OP LOGIC. 


147 


73 . 

Some pretenders to religion are deceitful; 

No virtuous persons are deceitful; 

Some virtuous persons are not pretenders to 
religion. 


74 . 

All boys ought to be educated ; 

Some persons not industrious ought to be 
educated ; 

Some persons not industrious are boys. 

75 . 

No unrighteous man shall enter the kingdom 
of heaven; 

Everyman who dies impenitent is unrighteous ; 

No men who die impenitent will enter the king¬ 
dom of heaven. 


70 . 

All diamonds consist of carbon ; 

All carbon is combustible ; 

Some combustible substances are diamonds. 


77 * 

Christians alone are truly charitable ; 
The man of Ross was a Christian; 
The man of Ross was truly charitable. 


PART III. 


ARGUMENTS FOR EXAMINATION; 

INCLUDING THE FALLACIES. 


“ If expiatory sacrifices were divinely appointed 
before the Mosaic law, they must have been ex¬ 
piatory, not of ceremonial sin, (which could not 
then exist,) but of moral sin : If so, the Levitical 
sacrifices must have had no less efficacy; and, in 
that case, the atonements under the Mosaic law 
would have ‘ made the comers thereunto perfect 
as pertaining to the conscience but this was 
not the case; therefore, —.—Davison on Prophecy. 

“ Thus to be called is to be blessed, and there¬ 
fore to be honoured with the signs of such a call¬ 
ing, must needs be, in part, a blessing also ; for 
of good things even the signs are good.”— 
Hooker. 

“ The Father by the Son did create and doth 
guide all; wherefore Christ hath supreme do¬ 
minion over the whole universal world.”— Ibid. 

Some persons, although men of the greatest 
learning, have committed errors; all persons. 



COMPENDIUM OE LOGIC. 


119 


who are men of sense, are not so liable to err 
as those who are foolish ; some who are not so 
liable to err as those who are foolish have, never¬ 
theless, committed great errors. 

“With some, God was not well-pleased; for 
they were overthrown in the wilderness.” 

" No one can possibly be happy without virtue, 
but there is no virtue without action ; therefore, 
these otiose and inactive deities of yours (allud¬ 
ing to the Epicurean notion of the gods) are not 
happy.”— Cicero. 

The sun was made at the creation to rule the 
day, and the moon and stars to rule the night; 
therefore, the pope is superior to kings and em¬ 
perors. 

“ He that is of God heareth my words ; ye, 
therefore, hear them not, because ye are not of 
God.” 

“ God shall judge the world, and therefore 
shall raise the world.”— Pearson. 

No trifling business will enrich those who are 
engaged in it; a mining speculation is no trifling 
business; therefore, a mining speculation will 
enrich those who are engaged in it. 

“‘Well, there are Ministers enough, without 
you.’ Ministers enough, and churches enough ! 
for what ? to reclaim all the sinners within the 
four seas ? If there were, they would all be re¬ 
claimed. But they are not reclaimed. There¬ 
fore, it is evident that there are not churches 
enough.”— Wesley's Farther Appeal. 

o 3 


150 


COilPKNUI UM 


“ It is an acknowledged fact, that monarchs pay 
the sad debt of nature ; and the rest of mankind 
are not exempt from death ; from which we may 
rationally infer, that kings, notwithstanding all 
the pomp and circumstance that surround them, 
are but men.” 

The total subversion of idolatry is much to be 
desired; for every one wishes that the worship of 
imaginary d'eities may be destroyed and over¬ 
thrown. 

“ There is scarcely a point in the evidence of 
Christianity which has not been conceded by 
some one of its defenders ; from which we may 
infer, that the system of religion in question is 
not true.” 

“ All brutes are four-footed animals ; a man 
that ill-uses his wife is a brute; therefore, he is a 
four-footed animal.” 

Homer was a blind man ; many persons read 
Homer with ease; therefore they are expert at 
reading a blind man. 

“ All the members form a society ; this man is 
a member; therefore this man forms a society.” 

“ The Wesleyan Magazine does not represent the 
views of the Wesleyans, for I am a Wesleyan ; 
and it does not represent my views.” 

Christians alone are truly charitable. The man 
of Ross was a Christian, we may therefore assert, 
that the man of Ross was truly charitable. 

A negro is a man ; therefore, he who murders a 
negro murders a man. 


OF LOGIC. 


151 


None but Ministers are allowed to perform 
certain duties ; this man is a Minister; therefore, 
he is allowed to perform those duties. 

“An ordinary Judge must be of the quality 
which in a supreme Judge is not necessary; be¬ 
cause the person of the one is charged with that 
which the other’s authority dischargeth, without 
employing personally himself therein.”— Hooker. 

“ If the prophecies of the Old Testament had 
been written without knowledge of the events of 
the time of Christ, they could not correspond 
with them exactly ; and if they had been forged 
by Christians, they would not be preserved and 
acknowledged by the Jews : They are preserved 
and acknowleged by the Jews, and they corre¬ 
spond exactly with the events of the time of 
Christ ; therefore, they were neither written with¬ 
out knowledge of those events, nor forged by 
Christians.”— Whately. 

To the verb “ to will,” in Saxon,' there is no 
imperative mood; from which we may infer that 
our ancestors believed in the freedom of the 
human mind and its volitions. 

“ We confess that we find it extremely difficult 
to distinguish between the Wesleyan doctrine of 
a distinct and indubitable internal witness, which 
tells the believer of his certain acceptance, and 
the Calvinistic doctrine of the perfect assurance 
of salvation. For if a man has once received 
from the Spirit a positive and irrevocable assur¬ 
ance that lie is a child of Cod, one hardly sees 
how he can stop short of the conclusion that his 


152 


COMPENDIUM 


calling and election is already made sure, and 
that his name is indelibly written in the book of 
life.” —British Critic, July, 1834. 

“ If God, by an act of annihilation, put an end 
to the being and the torments of the damned, it 
can only be when justice has received full repara¬ 
tion. But justice cannot receive full reparation, 
but by an immortality of punishment. The lost 
will, therefore, everlastingly exist.”— Langston's 
Essay, fyc. 

“Now, controversy being almost always the 
offspring or the parent of party, it is not wonder¬ 
ful that a love of disputation should almost 
always either give occasion to, or exasperate, 
party spirit.”— Whately’s Bampton Lectures. 

“ That there are subjects connected with reli¬ 
gion, which it is unprofitable, or worse than un¬ 
profitable, to discuss, no one would venture to 
deny; and it is no less undeniable, that among 
these are to be reckoned such as are neither laid 
open to us by revelation, nor are comprehensible 
by our reason ; but men are, in general, far less 
ready practically to conform to this maxim, than 
to admit its truths.”— Ibid. 

An unintentional insult should be immediately 
forgiven; an act which demands immediate for¬ 
giveness is sometimes a good act; therefore, some 
good act is an unintentional insult. 

No man of sound sense can despise the study 
of the classics; some modern pretenders to liter¬ 
ature do, however, despise the study of the 


OF LOGIC. 


153 


classics; therefore, some modern pretenders to 
literature are not men of sound sense. 

Some compositions of an imitative nature, 
calculated by sublimity of idea and beauty of 
diction to expand and to delight the mind, and 
to excite every noble passion, are not written in 
verse ; all such compositions, however, are justly 
called poems; therefore, some works justly called 
poems are not written in verse. 

It is not easy to comprehend what could have 
induced an impostor to forge two such epistles 
as the second and third attributed to St. John. 
They could not have been forged during that 
Apostle’s life; for the imposture would have been 
immediately detected : And if they had been 
forged after ( his death, it is not very probable 
that the impostor would have made his pretended 
author promise at the end of each Epistle that 
he would shortly pay a visit to those to whom 
the epistles were addressed. 

“The baptism of John, was it from heaven or 
of men ?” “ If we shall say. From heaven, he 

will say. Why then believed ye him not ? But if 
we say. Of men, all the people will stone us ; for 
they be persuaded that John was a Prophet.” 
(Luke xx. 4, 6.) 

If baptism could be justly refused to the child¬ 
ren of Christian parents, circumcision should on 
the same principle have been refused to the off¬ 
spring of Jewish parents. But the express com¬ 
mand of God proves that such refusal among the 
Jews would have been sinful. How then can it 


154 


COMPENDIUM 


be thought less criminal to withhold from the 
children of Christians their initiatory rite, and 
thus to rob them of an invaluable privilege which 
is clearly their due ? 

“ Sin cannot go unpunished; and, therefore, 
a forgiveness which implies its impunity is im¬ 
possible.”— Mason. 

“Therefore Plato would have the palace of 
princes joined unto temples ; because that go¬ 
vernment and religion, prayer and justice, the 
whole word and the sword, should never be 
severed .”—Bishop Reynolds. 

Those things which cannot be enumerated do 
not exist; innate ideas cannot be enumerated; 
therefore, innate ideas do not exist. 

The cook is always about the fire; the fire is 
the highest of all elements ; therefore, of all 
sciences the cook’s occupation is the highest. 

“ The publication of a libel is criminal: But 
the act of putting a libel into the post is an act 
of publication : (For the moment a man passes a 
libel from his hand his control of it is gone :) 
That act, therefore, cannot but be pronounced 
criminal .”—Lord Ellenborough. 

“ The gods are happy beings ; all happy beings 
are virtuous; all virtuous beings are endowed 
with reason : All beings endowed with reason 
bear the human form ; therefore, the gods bear the 
human form .”—Cicero (arguing as an Epicurean). 

Shame is not a virtue; for it bears the charac¬ 
ter of a passion rather than of a habit. 


OF LOGIC. 


155 


Vicious habits must not be classed among in¬ 
voluntary infirmities, because they do not excite 
compassion, but rather reprehension. 

So great is the importance of the habit of close 
and regular reasoning, that the study of mathe¬ 
matics must be essential to a complete course of 
education. 

No vice is to be admitted as a species of re¬ 
laxation suited to a Christian ; every species of 
relaxation suited to a Christian, consists of a 
cessation from ordinary occupations; therefore, 
some cessation from ordinary occupation is not 
vice. 

No tale-bearer is worthy of confidence; all 
tale-bearers are great talkers ; therefore, no great 
talkers are worthy of confidence. 

No rich men are exempt from death; nor are 
they free from error; therefore, none who are 
free from error are exempt from death. 

“ So that nonsense lies at the bottom of all; 
and is interwoven throughout their whole atheist¬ 
ical system ; and we ought to take notice of the 
invincible power and force of truth, prevailing 
irresistibly against all endeavours to oppress it; 
and how desperate the cause of atheism is, when 
that very atomical hypothesis of theirs, which 
they would erect and build up for a strong castle 
to garrison themselves in, proves a most effectual 
engine against themselves for the battering of all 
their atheistical structure down about their ears.” 
— Cudworth. 


COMPENDIUM 


156 

Neither reason nor analogy would lead us to 
think in particular, that the interposition of 
Christ, in the manner in which he did interpose, 
would be of that efficacy for the recovery of the 
world, which the Scripture teaches us it was : 
But neither would reason nor analogy lead us to 
think, that other particular means would be of 
the efficacy, which experience shows they are in 
numberless instances, And, therefore, as the 
case before us does not admit of experience ; so 
that neither reason nor analogy can show, how 
or in what particular way, the interposition of 
Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy 
which it is there represented to be ; this is no 
kind nor degree of presumption against its being 
really of efficacy. 


RECAPITULATORY TABLE 


OF 

TECHNICAL TERMS. 

CHIEFLY ABRIDGED FROM MR. WESLEY’S TEXT. 
IN THE BODY OF THE WORK. 


Absolute Conditions —are those which are suitable 
to the premises absolutely and in themselves. 
Those are said to be relative conditions which 
are suitable to the premises in reference to the 
conclusion. 

Abstraction —From abstraho, “ to draw off,” is the 
mental separation of certain qualities and cir¬ 
cumstances belonging to a subject, or class of 
subjects, and, while we withhold our notice from 
the rest, attending exclusively to them,p. 8. 

Accent, Fallacy of —is that which arises from 
false pronunciation ; as when, in speaking, words 
written with the same, or not very different, let¬ 
ters, are promiscuously confounded. 

Accident, Fallacy of —when some accidental cir¬ 
cumstance is confounded with what is essen¬ 
tial, p. 89. 

Accidental Definition —That which assigns the 
properties or accidents of the defined. It i3 
opposed to essential definition ; and, in com¬ 
mon conversation, is termed “ a description/’ 

p. 20. 



158 


COMPENDIUM 


Analogous words —are those wliose one significa¬ 
tion agrees unequally, p. 7. 

Analysis —is the resolution of effects into their first 
causes, to obtain perfect knowledge of them. 

Antecedent —The conditional part of a conditional 
hypothetical syllogism, p. 72. 

Amphibolia, or Amphibologia —is a fallacy in which 
the doubt arises, not so much from an uncertain 
use of singular words, as from the different 
kinds of construction of which the sentence is 
capable. Of this fallacy most ancient oracles 
form apt examples. 

Apprehension , Simple —The bare conceiving of a 
thing in the mind, p. 2. 

A priori —An expression in argument to denote 
that the propositions are derived from defini¬ 
tions, or from other propositions previously 
known. 

A posteriori —An expression used to denote that 
the propositions are drawn from experience. 

Argument —The third operation Of the mind ex¬ 
pressed in words. It is called a syllogism when 
laid down in the technical form. 

Belief— Assent upon testimony, p. 82. 

Canon —In logic, a proposition containing the 
reason of the consequence in a dialectical 
syllogism. 

Categorematic words —called “ Simple Terms ” in 
their relation to a proposition, are such as may 
by themselves he its subject or predicate, p. 5. 

Categorical Proposition. —That which directly and 


OF LOGIC. 


161 


Entkymeme —An imperfect sort of argument, one 
premise of which is wanting, p. 68. 

Equivocal Term —One whose different significa¬ 
tions agree equally, p. 7. 

Equivocation , Fallacy of —p. 88. 

Essential Definition —p. 24. 

Extreme —Another word used to express the terms 
of a proposition. In relation to a syllogism, 
the middle or third term is never thus denomi¬ 
nated. 

Fallacy —An argument intended to deceive, p. 88. 

Figure —The disposition of the third term in refer¬ 
ence to the extremes; or the manner of com¬ 
paring the medium with the terms of the con¬ 
clusion, p. 54. 

Genus —That which is predicated of several things 
as the common part of their essence, p. 10. 

Hypothetical Syllogism —That which has one or 
more of its propositions hypothetical, p. 72. 

Illative Conversion —is when the truth of the con¬ 
verse is necessarily inferred from that of the 
proposition in its original form, p. 39. 

Indirect Reduction —is when the opponent is com¬ 
pelled to confess some absurd or impossible 
thing. 

Imperfect Syllogism —is one that has some defect 
either in the number of the premises, in theig 
disposition, or in the inference from them* 

p 3 


164 


COMPENDIUM 


Ostensive Demonstration —is that in which the 
conclusion is evidently and directly inferred 
from former and more known causes. 

Paradox —A proposition which is true, though 
contrary to common and vulgar opinion. 

Per Accidens —applied to predication, is when, of 
two accidents existing in a common subject, the 
one is predicated of the other, as this white of 
this sweet. 

Per Accidens —Conversion is so called, when the 
quality of the proposition remaining the same, 
its quantity only is changed, p. 38, 

Physical Definition —That which assigns the really 
distinct parts of its essence, p. 26. 

Predicate —is that which is actually said of some¬ 
thing else in the same sense, p. 16. 

Predicable —is that capable of being said of some¬ 
thing else, p. 10. 

Premises —Propositions are so called by which 
some conclusion is proved. 

Problem — Another name for the question to be 
proved : in other words, that which is to be the 
conclusion when it is proved, p. 45. 

Property —That which is predicated of several 
things, as necessarily joined to their essence, 

p. 10. 

Proposition —An affirmative or negative sentence ; 
signifying true or false; not ambiguous ; nor 
maimed and incomplete, p. 29. 

Prove — See Infer. 

Proximate —That which is nearer. 


or LOGIC. 


165 


Pure Categorical —said of a proposition, when it 
pronounces a thing absolutely and without any 
condition, p. 30. 


Quality of a Proposition —Its being either affirm¬ 
ative or negative, p. 31. 

Quantity of a Proposition —is its being either uni¬ 
versal or particular, p. 31. 

Question — That which is to be the conclusion of a 
syllogism, when it has been proved. 

Real Definition —That which explains the nature 
of the thing, p. 24. 

Reduction , Ostensive .— See Ostensive Demonstra¬ 
tion. 

Reduction per impossibile —is when, from granted 
premises, we prove the conclusions to be there¬ 
fore true, because their contradictories are ap¬ 
parently false. 

Separable Accident —p. 21. 

Singular Word —That which expresses one thing 
only, p. 6. 

Sorites —From aoopbs, a “ heap A kind of argu¬ 
ment in whose antecedent every preceding term 
is subjected to the following, till you come 
from the subject of the conclusion to the pre¬ 
dicate of it, p. 71 . 

Species — A predicable which is said of several 
things, of their whole essence, p. 10. 

SubalternSpecies and Genus —mean the same thing 
under a different relation; the former, when 


COMPENDIUM OP LOGIC. 


i m 


subjected to a higher genus, and then it be¬ 
comes a species ; the latter, when predicated of a 
lower species, and then it becomes a genus, 
p. 17. 

Subcontrary Opposition —p. 37- 

Subject of a Proposition —That term of which 
something else is said. 

Siimmum Genus —That which can never be a spe¬ 
cies, p. 16. 

Syllogism —The'operation of ratiocination, or rea¬ 
soning, expressed fully and technically in pro¬ 
positions, according to the logical form, p. 42. 

Syncategorematic Words —Such as cannot, of them¬ 
selves, be the subject or predicate of a propo¬ 
sition, p. 5. 

Temporal Syllogism —A kind of conditional, in 
which some limitation in regard to time is 
found. 

Term —From terminus : The boundary or extreme 
of a proposition, that is, subject or predicate. 

Universal Proposition — One which declares some¬ 
thing else of all the subject, and has a particle 
of universality expressed or understood, p. 31. 

Univocal Word —whose one signification equally 
agrees to several things, p. 7. 


THE END. 


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